Working Papers

• Stress test precision and bank competition (with Tuomas Takalo), Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper 3/2024. (Full text)

• General Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy when Firms have Market Power (with E. Petrakis), uc3m working paper 2024-02. (Full text)

• The Non-Neutrality of the Arm's Length Principle with Imperfect Competition (with Ana B. Lemus), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper 18-06. (Full text)

Publications

• Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks’ Stability and Welfare (with Tuomas Takalo), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming. (Full text)

• Stress Test Precision and Bank Competition (with T. Takalo), Economics Letters (2024) 238, 111702. (Full text).

• The Impact on Market Outcomes of the Portfolio Selection of Large Equity Investors (with E. Petrakis), Economics Letters (2022) 212, 110296. (Full text)

• The Interactions of R&D Investments and Horizontal Mergers (with Christos Cabolis, Constantine Manasakis and Emmanuel Petrakis),*Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization* (2021) 187: 507-534. (Full
text)

• Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests (with Ezra Einy and Aner Sela),*Economic Theory Bulletin*
(2020) 8: 333-345. (Full text)

• Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books under the Arm's Length Principle (with Ana B. Lemus),*Mathematical
Social Sciences* (2020) 106: 78-90. (Full
text)

• Information in Tullock Contests (with Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz), Theory and Decision, (2019) 69: 303-323. (Full text)

• Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantages (with Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economics Letters (2018) 172: 34-36. (Full text)

• The Value of Public Information in Common Value Tullock Contests (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2017) 63: 925-942. (Full Text)

• Reserve Prices in Auctions with Entry when the Seller is Risk Averse (with John Wooders), Economics Letters (2017) 154: 6-9. (Full text)

• Price Cap Regulation with Capacity Precommitment (con Ana B. Lemus), International Journal of Industrial Organization (2017) 50: 131–158. (Full text)

• Optimal bank transparency (with Tuomas Takalo), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (2016) 48, 203-231. (Full text)

• Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention (with John Wooders), Theoretical Economics (2016) 11, 601-639. (Full text)

• Equilibrium Existence in Tullock Contests with Incomplete Information (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Mathematical Economics (2015) 61: 241-245. (Full text)

• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods (with María José Moscoso), Economic Theory (2013) 52: 315-336. (Full text)

• Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs (with John Wooders), RAND Journal of Economics, (2011) 42: 313–336. (Full text)

• On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko and Benyamin Shitovitz), Games and Economic Behavior (2010) 68: 77-94. (Full text)

• Decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem (with John Wooders), International Economic Review (2010) 51: 383-399. (Full text. The companion working paper: UC3M-wp2007-12)

• Uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko and Benyamin Shitovitz), Mathematics of Operations Research (2008) 33: 552-560. (Full text)

• Capacity precommitment and price competition yield Cournot outcomes (with Luis Ubeda), Games and Economic Behavior (2006) 56: 323-332. (Full text)

• On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2005) 26: 793 - 812. (Full text)

• Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly (with Juan Delgado), Journal of Economic Theory (2004) 114: 231-254. (Full text)

• The value of public information in Cournot oligopoly (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Games and Economic Behavior (2003) 44: 272-285. (Full text)

• Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 106: 151-160. (Full text)

• Prices, delay and the dynamics of trade (with John Wooders), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 104: 304-339. (Full text.)

• The bargaining set of a large exchange economy with differential information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2001) 18: 473-484. (Full text)

• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2001) 18: 321-332. (Full text)

• On the core of an economy with differential information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (2000) 94: 262-270. (Full text)

• Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Mathematical Economics (2000), 34: 527-535. (Full text)

• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic, Economic Theory (1999) 13: 183-197. (Full text)

• The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (1999), 89: 186-206. (Full text)

• The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), International Journal of Game Theory (1999) 28: 1-14. (Full text)

• The least core, kernel, and bargaining sets of large games (with Ezra Einy and Dov Monderer), Economic Theory (1998) 11: 585-602. (Full text)

• An experimental study of communication and cooperation in noncooperative games (with John Wooders), Games and Economic Behavior (1998) 24: 47-76. (Full text)

• Coalition-proof equilibrium (with John Wooders), Games and Economic Behavior (1996) 17: 80-112.

(Full text)

• Convergence theorems for a class of recursive stochastic algorithms (with Mark Walker). In J. Ledyard (Ed.): The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability; Kluwer Academic Publisher, Amsterdam, 1995. ( Full text)

• Two problems in applying Ljung's `projection algorithms' to the analysis of decentralized learning (with Mark Walker), Journal of Economic Theory (1994) 62: 420-427. (Full text)

• Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments, Social Choice and Welfare (1994) 11: 225-240. (Full text)

• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable (with Mark Walker), Social Choice and Welfare (1991) 8: 221-233. (Full text)

• Stress test precision and bank competition (with Tuomas Takalo), Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper 3/2024. (Full text)

• General Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy when Firms have Market Power (with E. Petrakis), uc3m working paper 2024-02. (Full text)

• The Non-Neutrality of the Arm's Length Principle with Imperfect Competition (with Ana B. Lemus), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper 18-06. (Full text)

Publications

• Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks’ Stability and Welfare (with Tuomas Takalo), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming. (Full text)

• Stress Test Precision and Bank Competition (with T. Takalo), Economics Letters (2024) 238, 111702. (Full text).

• The Impact on Market Outcomes of the Portfolio Selection of Large Equity Investors (with E. Petrakis), Economics Letters (2022) 212, 110296. (Full text)

• The Interactions of R&D Investments and Horizontal Mergers (with Christos Cabolis, Constantine Manasakis and Emmanuel Petrakis),

• Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests (with Ezra Einy and Aner Sela),

• Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books under the Arm's Length Principle (with Ana B. Lemus),

• Information in Tullock Contests (with Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz), Theory and Decision, (2019) 69: 303-323. (Full text)

• Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantages (with Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economics Letters (2018) 172: 34-36. (Full text)

• The Value of Public Information in Common Value Tullock Contests (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2017) 63: 925-942. (Full Text)

• Reserve Prices in Auctions with Entry when the Seller is Risk Averse (with John Wooders), Economics Letters (2017) 154: 6-9. (Full text)

• Price Cap Regulation with Capacity Precommitment (con Ana B. Lemus), International Journal of Industrial Organization (2017) 50: 131–158. (Full text)

• Optimal bank transparency (with Tuomas Takalo), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (2016) 48, 203-231. (Full text)

• Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention (with John Wooders), Theoretical Economics (2016) 11, 601-639. (Full text)

• Equilibrium Existence in Tullock Contests with Incomplete Information (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Mathematical Economics (2015) 61: 241-245. (Full text)

• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods (with María José Moscoso), Economic Theory (2013) 52: 315-336. (Full text)

• Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs (with John Wooders), RAND Journal of Economics, (2011) 42: 313–336. (Full text)

• On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko and Benyamin Shitovitz), Games and Economic Behavior (2010) 68: 77-94. (Full text)

• Decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem (with John Wooders), International Economic Review (2010) 51: 383-399. (Full text. The companion working paper: UC3M-wp2007-12)

• Uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko and Benyamin Shitovitz), Mathematics of Operations Research (2008) 33: 552-560. (Full text)

• Capacity precommitment and price competition yield Cournot outcomes (with Luis Ubeda), Games and Economic Behavior (2006) 56: 323-332. (Full text)

• On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2005) 26: 793 - 812. (Full text)

• Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly (with Juan Delgado), Journal of Economic Theory (2004) 114: 231-254. (Full text)

• The value of public information in Cournot oligopoly (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Games and Economic Behavior (2003) 44: 272-285. (Full text)

• Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 106: 151-160. (Full text)

• Prices, delay and the dynamics of trade (with John Wooders), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 104: 304-339. (Full text.)

• The bargaining set of a large exchange economy with differential information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2001) 18: 473-484. (Full text)

• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2001) 18: 321-332. (Full text)

• On the core of an economy with differential information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (2000) 94: 262-270. (Full text)

• Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Mathematical Economics (2000), 34: 527-535. (Full text)

• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic, Economic Theory (1999) 13: 183-197. (Full text)

• The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (1999), 89: 186-206. (Full text)

• The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), International Journal of Game Theory (1999) 28: 1-14. (Full text)

• The least core, kernel, and bargaining sets of large games (with Ezra Einy and Dov Monderer), Economic Theory (1998) 11: 585-602. (Full text)

• An experimental study of communication and cooperation in noncooperative games (with John Wooders), Games and Economic Behavior (1998) 24: 47-76. (Full text)

• Coalition-proof equilibrium (with John Wooders), Games and Economic Behavior (1996) 17: 80-112.

(Full text)

• Convergence theorems for a class of recursive stochastic algorithms (with Mark Walker). In J. Ledyard (Ed.): The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability; Kluwer Academic Publisher, Amsterdam, 1995. ( Full text)

• Two problems in applying Ljung's `projection algorithms' to the analysis of decentralized learning (with Mark Walker), Journal of Economic Theory (1994) 62: 420-427. (Full text)

• Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments, Social Choice and Welfare (1994) 11: 225-240. (Full text)

• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable (with Mark Walker), Social Choice and Welfare (1991) 8: 221-233. (Full text)

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