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- The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment \bullet
- Policy Implications \bullet





Motivation and Main Findings

Motivation- Why look at public investment now?

- In AEs, there is still a lot of slack, compounded by worries over secular stagnation
- In many EMDEs, infrastructure bottlenecks are contributing to slower growth
- Across all economies, there are concerns about long-run potential, with insufficient public/infrastructure investment being one of the reasons for concern
- Given the current environment of low borrowing costs, might this be a good time to increase public investment?



Summary of main findings: the time is right for an infrastructure push

- The stock of public capital, a proxy for infrastructure, has declined significantly as a share of output over the past three decades across the world
 - In emerging market and developing economies, gaps in the quantity of infrastructure per capita are glaring
 - In some advanced economies the quality of the existing infrastructure stock is deteriorating
- Higher public infrastructure investment boosts output in the short and long term
- The effects are stronger during periods of economic slack and monetary accommodation, and when investment efficiency is high
- Debt-financed public investment tends to have large output effects without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio



The Economic of Infrastructure

Characteristics of infrastructure investment

- Infrastructure investments are often large, capital-intensive projects that tend to be "natural monopolies
- Tend to have significant up-front costs, but the benefits or returns accrue over very long periods of time, often many decades
- Have the potential to generate positive externalities, so that the social return to a project can exceed the private returns it can generate for the operator
- In deciding which infrastructure projects to undertake, governments must carefully weigh broader social returns against funding costs and fiscal consequences



The macroeconomic effect of infrastructure investment: a conceptual framework

- Infrastructure investments increases output in the short-term by boosting aggregate demand
 - the size of the effect depends on the state of the economy
- Infrastructure investments increases output in the long-term by boosting aggregate supply
 - the size of the effect depends on the efficiency of investment
- If short-term multipliers, public investment efficiency, and the elasticity of output to public capital are sufficiently high, an increase in public investment can be "selffinancing" in that it leads to a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio



Public and Infrastructure Capital and Investment: Where Do We Stand?

The stock of public capital has declined as share of output across all income groups





In EMDEs infrastructure gaps are glaring



In some AEs the quality of infrastructure is deteriorating









Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment in AEs: Empirical Evidence

Baseline

$$y_{i,t+k} - y_{i,t} = \alpha_i^k + \gamma_t^k + \beta^k F E_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^k$$

FE is fiscal shock, identified as the forecast error of public investment as share of GDP (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, 2013)

Non-linear effects

$$y_{i,t+k} - y_{i,t} = \alpha_i^k + \gamma_t^k + \beta_1^k G(z_t) F E$$

with

$$G(z_{it}) = \frac{\exp[i(-\gamma z_{it})]}{1 + \exp[i(-\gamma z_{it})]}, \quad \gamma > 0$$

z is an indicator of the state of the economy (or degree of public investment efficiency)



t,

$E_{i,t} + \beta_2^k (1 - G(z_t)) F E_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^k$



Larger effects during periods of economic slack...

Figure 5. Effect of Public Investment in Advanced Economies: Role of Economic Conditions (Years on x-axis) Output 2. High Growth (percent) 2 3 1 0 2 0 4 -1 Debt 4. High Growth (percent of GDP)





-1

0

1

3

2



...and in countries with greater efficiency...





...and when is debt financed





Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment in EMs and LICs: Empirical Evidence





Three complementary approaches

booms (Warner, 2014)

2.Identify exogenous shocks to public investment as residuals from an estimated spending rule (Corsetti, Meier and Muller, 2012)

loans from official creditors to developing countries (Eden and Kraay, 2014)

1.Describe the evolution of key macroeconomic variables surrounding public investment

- 3.Instrument public investment with the predetermined component of disbursement on

Public investment booms identified as large increases in government investment spending

Figure 8. Public Investment (percent of GDP)





... and are accompanied by a sustained rise in the level of output, while debt levels remain unchanged

Figure 9. Output and Public Debt in the Aftermath of Public Investment Booms (Years on x-axis)

-1

0

1

2



2. Public Debt (percent of GDP)



6

Public investment has a positive, long lasting effect on output in EMs and LICs.



Figure 9. Effect of Public Investment on Output in Emerging Market and Developing Economies (Percent; years on x-axis)





Summary of empirical findings on macroeconomic effects of public investment

Public investment has a positive and long lasting effect on the level of output.

No evidence of rising levels of public debt or crowding out private investment.

Macroeconomic response is shaped by:

- **Degree of economic slack**: positive output effects are more pronounced when public investment is undertaken during periods of economic slack.
- **Efficiency of public investment**: countries with greater efficiency of public investment get a bigger bang for their buck.
 - How public investment is financed: Public investment has larger output effects when it is financed by issuing debt rather than by raising taxes or cutting other spending.



Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment: Model Simulations

Current scenario for AEs

1. Output (percent deviation from baseline) 2.5 1.5 0.5 2. Debt (percentage-point-of-GDP deviation from baseline) -1 -2 -3 -4 3. Private Investment (percent deviation from baseline)







Figure 12. Model Simulations: Effect of Public Investment in Advanced Economies–Role of Efficiency



The Role of Efficiency







The effect of public investment shocks in AEs, EMs and LICs





Figure 14. Effect of Public Investment Shocks



2023

Summary of simulation findings on macroeconomic effects of public investment

AEs

- •Public Investment has a positive and long lasting effect on the level of output
- •Evidence of a decrease in the level of public debt and crowding in of private investment
- •Larger macroeconomic responses in periods of economic slack [mp accommodates] and for greater efficiency of public investment

EMs and LICs

- Public Investment has a positive and long lasting effect on the level of output, but lower effects compared to AEs
- Lower efficiency of public investment leads to a trade-off between higher output and debt

Policy Implications

The time is right for an infrastructure push

- \bullet investment processes and where there is economic slack and monetary spending.
- For these economies, the positive effects on output of increasing public •
- better project appraisal, selection, and execution.

For economies with clearly identified infrastructure needs and efficient public accommodation, there is a strong case for increasing public infrastructure

infrastructure investment actually lead to a decline in public-debt-to-GDP ratios.

Increasing the efficiency of public investment is critical to reap its full benefits. Thus, the key priority for economies with relatively low efficiency of public investment should be to raise the quality of infrastructure investment through





The stock of public capital per capita is still much higher in AEs than in EMDEs...

Figure 15. Real Per Capita Public Capital Stock, 2010 (2005 PPP dollars per person)





MENAP





There is a strong correlation between public capital and physical measures of infrastructure across countries.

Figure 16. Infrastructure and Real Public Capital Stock per capita (average, 2005–11)



Infra stocks

Log of real public capital stock per capita



The macroeconomic effect of infrastructure investment: a Conceptual framework

- Infrastructure investments increases output in the short-term by boosting aggregate demand, and the debt-to-(potential) GDP ratio by: $\Delta d = (1 \mu \tau) \Delta i$
- Infrastructure investments increases output in the long-term by boosting aggregate supply, which will generate future tax dividends: $\tau \Delta Y = \tau \epsilon y_0 \Delta i$
- If short-term multipliers, public investment efficiency, and the elasticity of output to public capital are sufficiently high such that: $(r g)(1 \mu\tau) \tau \varepsilon y_o \le 0$

then an increase in public investmen reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio

then an increase in public investment can be "self-financing" in that it leads to a



Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment Shocks in AEs



AEs results- robustness checks

Table 1. Effect of Public Investment on Output in Advanced Economies: Robustness

	Baseline	April forecast	Previous October Forecast	Growth	Demand components ¹	Positive Shocks	Negative Shocks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Impact of p	oublic investment	shock on output at <i>k</i> =	=				
0	0.457	0.264	0.332	0.418	0.502	1.013	0.316
	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.118)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.447)	(0.181)
1	0.755	0.581	0.697	0.702	0.844	1.240	0.584
	(0.238)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.241)	(0.264)	(0.619)	(0.309)
2	1.035	0.966	1.004	0.993	1.241	1.576	0.888
	(0.322)	(0.270)	(0.288)	(0.323)	(0.339)	(0.763)	(0.431)
3	1.389	1.099	1.124	1.354	1.625	1.706	1.242
	(0.394)	(0.349)	(0.330)	(0.393)	(0.405)	(0.754)	(0.547)
4	1.539	1.318	1.219	1.507	1.864	1.459	1.393
	(0.441)	(0.402)	(0.383)	(0.439)	(0.489)	(0.715)	(0.617)

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¹ Demand components include private consumption, investment, and government consumption.

Purging Forecast Errors of Forecast Errors in

AEs results- robustness checks







Figure 17. Effect of Public Investment Shocks on Output, Recessions vs. Expansions: Robustness Checks (Percent; years on x-axis) Recessions as Negative Growth Dummy



AEs results- robustness checks







Distribution of public investment booms

Figure 20. Distribution of Public Investment Booms over Time (Number of Countries)









Effects of public investment booms-robustness checks

Figure 22. Output and Public Debt in the Aftermath of Public Investment Booms: Role of Natural Resources (Years on x-axis)







Effects of public investment in EMDEs-robustness checks

 Table 2. Effect of Public Investment on Output in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Public

 Investment Shocks Derived from a Fiscal Policy Rule

	Baseline 1/		Full sample		Top and Bottom 5 Percent of S Trimmed	
k	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
—1	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0.252	(0.066)	0.144	(0.074)	0.324	(0.10
1	0.340	(0.096)	0.193	(0.086)	0.571	(0.14
2	0.331	(0.126)	0.187	(0.100)	0.567	(0.19
3	0.384	(0.152)	0.225	(0.119)	0.728	(0.23
4	0.497	(0.189)	0.239	(0.174)	1.010	(0.31

Note: Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the estimated coefficients on the public investment shock from a series of regression estimates for each k in $\{0,4\}$. Standard errors (SEs) of the estimated coefficients, which are shown in columns (2), (4), and (6), are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country level. There are 128 economies in the sample, with data from 1990–2013. All regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. k = 0 is the year of the shock.

¹In the baseline specification, the top and bottom 1 percent of public investment shocks are trimmed.



Shocks

Effects of public investment in EMDEs-robustness checks

Table 3. Effect of Public Investment on Output in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Public **Investment Instrumented by Predicted Official Loan Disbursement**

		High Disbursement			
	Baseline	Countries	IDA		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
1 Eirot Stago, Donondont Variable - Chango in Bublic Investme	nt as Democrat of CDD				
T. First Stage: Dependent variable—Change in Public investme	nt as Percent of GDP	0 4 7 0	0.400		
Change in Predicted Disbursements	0.140	0.170	0.122		
	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.063)		
First stgage F-statistic	3.705	5.344	7.217		
Number of Observations	3,245	2,294	1,864		
Number of Countries	95	66	58		
2 Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent Variable—Output Grow	<i>r</i> th				
Impact of Change in Public Investment on Output at k =					
0	0.655	0.716	0.765		
	(0.484)	(0.418)	(0.641)		
1	1.700	1.691	1.801		
	(0.841)	(0.748)	(1.146)		
2	1.425	1.570	1.396		
	(1.009)	(0.912)	(1.329)		
3	1.359	1.700	1.156		
	(1.112)	(1.017)	(1.534)		
4	1.018	1.548	0.438		
	(1.243)	(1.112)	(1.675)		

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: k = 0 is the year of the change in public investment instrumented by the change in predicted loan disbursement. Panel (1) reports ordinary least-squares estimates of the first-stage regression of change in public investment on change in predicted loan disbursements. Panel (2) shows the two-stage least-squares estimates of the effect of change in public investment on real output from a series of regressions estimated for each k in {0,4}. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country level. Data are from 1970–2010. All regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Results from three different samples are presented in columns (1), (2), and (3)—respectively, the full set of countries, only countries where disbursements of loans from official creditors



Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment Shocks- Model Simulations



Technical assumptions

AEs : US, Japan and euro area(GIMF)

- Elasticity of government capital to output= 0.17 [alternatives: 0.122, 0.193, Bonn and Ligthart (2013)]
- No waste [i.e. all public investment is productive [alternative 23% of investment is wasteful,WEF]
- Monetary policy accommodates for the first 2 years [alternatives, mp policy tightens immediately]
- Steady state short real interest rate at 1%
- Investment shock is debt financed for the first 5 years. Debt is stabilized and general transfers adjust afterward

• EMs : Emerging Asia and LAC (GIMF)

- Elasticity of government capital to output= 0.17
- 35% of investment is wasteful [average PIMI]
- Steady state short real interest rate at 1%
- MP tightens immediately
- Investment shock is debt financed for the first 5 years. Debt is stabilized and general transfers adjust afterward

LICs (Buffie et al. 2012)

- Elasticity of government capital to output= 0.17
- 50% of investment is wasteful [average PIMI]
- 50 percent of investment shock financed by concessional loans, 50 percent by raising VAT



The Role of Fiscal Institutions

Figure 24. Protection of Capital Expenditure (change in public investment; percent of total spending, 2010-12)



Medium Plannning Institutions

Weak Planning Institutions



