Industrial Organization

Topics in Health Economics

Graduate program of the Department of Economics UC3M 2015-2016 Prof. Matilde P. Machado

1. Introduction ¹

• Arrow, Kenneth, J. (1963). "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care." American Economic Review, 53: 941-73.

2. Demand for Health Care

2.1 Moral Hazard

- Pauly, Mark (1968) "The Economics of Moral Hazard: comment," American Economic Review, 58(3): 531-537
- Manning, W. G. et al. (1987). "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment." **American Economic Review**. 77: 251-277.
- Aron-Dine, Aviva, Einav, Liran and Finkelstein, Amy (2013): "The Rand Health Insurance Experiment Three Decades Later," Journal of Economic **Perspectives,** vol 27(1), pp 197-222.
- Finkelstein, Amy et al. (2012): "The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year." **Quarterly Journal of Economics**. Vol. 127 (3), 1057-1106
- Barros, Pedro P., Machado, Matilde P., and Sanz-de-Galdeano, Anna: "Moral hazard and the demand for health services: a matching estimator approach," Journal of Health Economics, vol 27, July 2008, pp 1006-1025.

2.2 Adverse Selection and Risk Selection

- Einav, Liran and Amy Finkelstein (2011): "Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures," **Journal of Economic Perspectives**, 25(1): 115-138.
- Rothschild, Michael and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1976). "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information." **Quarterly Journal of Economics** 90(4): 630-49.

¹ Papers are listed in the order they are to be studied in class.

Testing for Adverse Selection

- Chiappori, P.A. y Salanié, B. (2000): "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets." Journal of Political Economy, vol 108, 56-78.
- Vera, Marcos, Olivella, Pau: "Testing for Adverse Selection into Private Medical Insurance," **The Economic Journal**, 123, 96-130 (or IFS Working paper WP06/02). (*This paper was awarded the Royal Economic Society Prize for the best unsolicited paper published in The Economic Journal in 2013.*)

Additional readings for first part of the course:

Cutler, David M. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. (2000): "The Anatomy of Health Insurance," in **Handbook of Health Economics**, Vol. 1, A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse (Eds).

3. Supply of Health goods and services

3.1. The Effect of Health Insurance Mandates

• Gruber, Jonathan (1994): "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," **The American Economic Review**, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jun., 1994), pp. 622-641 (*This paper was the Arrow Award winner for the best published paper in Health Economics in 1995.*)

3.2. Comparing the performance of Health Care Providers

• Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Town, Robert (1999) – "Estimating the Quality of Care in Hospitals using Instrumental Variables," **Journal of Health Economics**, 18, pp 747-67.

3.3. Competition and Information

• Dranove, David, Kessler, Daniel P., McClellan, Mark, and Satterthwaite, Mark (2003). "Is More Information Better? The Effects of 'Report Cards' on Health Care Providers," Journal of Political Economy, 111(3): 555-588.

3.4. Reaction of Suppliers to financial Incentives

• Mullen, K.J., Frank, Richard G., and Rosenthal, Meredith B. (2010): "Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers," **The Rand Journal of Economics**, Vol. 41, N° 1, 64-91.

Additional readings:

Gaynor, Martin, Ho, Kate and Town, Robert J. (2015): "The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, 53(2), 235-284.

<u>Course Evaluation</u>: Final exam and presentation of a paper from a list of published papers in health economics.

List of papers for class presentations from which students can select:

(1) Chiappori, Pierre-André, Durand, Frank, Geoffard, Pierre-Yves (1998): "Moral Hazard and the Demand for physician services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment," European Economic Review, 42, pp 499-511.

(2) Glazer, Jacob, McGuire, Thomas G., and Joseph P. Newhouse (2007): "Using Performance Measures to Motivate 'report-adverse' and 'report-loving' agents," Journal of Health Economics, 26, 1170-1189.

(3) Beakley, Hoyt (2007): "Disease and Development: Evidence from Hookworm Eradication in the American South," QJE, February 2007.

(4) Chandra, Amitabh and Staiger, Douglas O. (2007): "Productivity Spillovers in Health Care: Evidence from the treatment of heart attacks," JPE, vol 115(1), pp 103-140. *This paper was the Arrow Award winner for the best published paper in Health Economics in 2007.*

(5) Finkelstein, Amy (2007): "The aggregate effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare," QJE, February 2007

(6) Iizuka, Toshiaki (2007): "Experts' agency Problems: Evidence from Japan" RAND Journal of Economics, 38(3), 844-862.

(7) Card, David, Dobkin, Carlos and Nicole Maestas (2008): "The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Medicare" AER, 98(5), 2242-2258.

(8) Fang, Hanming, Keane, Michael P., and Dan Silverman (2008): "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," JPE, 116(2), 303-350. *This paper was the Arrow Award winner for the best published paper in Health Economics in 2008.*

(9) Currie, Janet, Neidell, Matthew, and Johannes F. Schmieder (2009): "Air Pollution and Infant Health: Lessons from New Jersey," Journal of Health Economics, 28, 688-703.

(10) Propper, Carol and Van Reenen, John (2010): "Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance", Journal of Political Economy, 118(2), 222-273. *This paper was the Arrow Award winner for the best published paper in Health Economics in 2010.*

(11) Almond, Douglas, Doyle, Joseph J., Kowalski, Amanda E., Williams, Heidi (2010): "Estimating Marginal Returns to Medical Care: Evidence from atrisk Newborns," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2010

(12) Miller, Grant and B. Piedad Urdinola (2010): "Cyclicality, Mortality, and the Value of Time: The Case of Coffee Price Fluctuations and Child Survival in Colombia," The Journal of Political Economy, vol 118, No. 1, 113-155.

(13) Cebul, Randall D., Rebitzer, James B., Taylor, Lowell J., Votruba, Mark E. (2011): "Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance," American Economic Review, 101, 1842-1871. *This paper was the Arrow Award winner for the best published paper in Health Economics in 2011.*

(14) Kolstad, Jonathan T. (2013): "Information and quality when motivation is intrinsic: evidence from surgeon report cards," American Economic Review 103(7): 2875-2910. (<u>http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.7.2875</u>) *This paper was the Arrow Award winner for the best published paper in Health Economics in 2013.*

(15) Propper, Carol, Burgess, Simon M. and Gossage, Denise (2008): "Competition and Quality: Evidence from the NHS Internal Market 1991-9," Economic Journal 118 (525): 138-170.

<u>Complementary reading/references on Econometric Methods (Not to be chosen for</u> <u>Presentations):</u>

- Abadie, Alberto and Javier Gardeazabal (2003): "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country", American Economic Review, 93(1), 112-132.
- (2) Abadie, Alberto, Diamond, Alexis, and Jens Hainmueller (2010): "Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco Control Program," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490), Applications and Case Studies.
- (3) Bound, John, Jaeger, David A., and Baker, Regina (1993): "The cure can be worse than the disease: A cautionary tale regarding instrumental variables", NBER Technical Paper, #137.
- (4) Cameron, A. Colin, Gelbach, Jonah B., Miller, Douglas L. (2006): "Robust Inference with Multi-Way Clustering," NBER Technical WP Series 327.
- (5) Feldman and Dowd (1991): "New Evidence on the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," AER 81, 297-301.
- (6) Train, Kenneth E. (2002): Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, Cambridge University Press, chapters 2, 3, 4.