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Personal Information:
Born: May, 21, 1984   **Marital Status**: Single   **Citizenship:** Spanish

Undergraduate Studies:
   B.A. (Licenciatura) in Economics, Universidad de Oviedo, 2006

Graduate Studies:
   M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2008
   Ph.D. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, May 2012 (expected)
   Thesis Title: "Essays in the Economic Theory of Organizations"

   References:

   Antonio Cabrales (Main Advisor)
   Professor of Economics,
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   acabrale@eco.uc3m.es
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   Marco Celentani
   Associate Professor of Economics,
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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   Luis C. Corchón
   Professor of Economics,
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   lcorchon@eco.uc3m.es
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Teaching and Research Fields:
   Research fields: Applied Theory, Theory of Organizations, Industrial Organization

   Teaching fields: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Business Economics

Teaching Experience:

Graduate	**Microeconomics I and II** . Core Ph.D. Courses (in English.) Teaching Assitant for Professors Diego Moreno and Angel Hernando	
Undergraduate	**Microeconomic Theory**. General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics (students in 2nd and 3rd years, both in English and Spanish.)	

Instructor (2011) and TA for Professors Marco Celentani and Mikhail Drugov (2008-2010)
Game and Decision Theory. TA for Introductory Game Theory (spanish) (2007)
Introduction to Macroeconomics. TA (spanish) (2007)

Professional Activities:
Referee for *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*
Co-Organizer Students Only Seminar, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (2010-2011)
University Administration: Elected Member to "Junta de Facultad" (2010-2012)

Academic Visits:
2010 (Jan-April): LSE Managerial Economics and Strategy Group (supervisor Luis Garicano)

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:
2006	Undergraduate Graduation Speech, Universidad de Oviedo
2006-2008	Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Tuition Waiver and Scholarship
2008-2010	FPU Scholarship, Spanish Ministry of Education
2008	FPI Scholarship, Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, Declined
2010	UC3M Teaching Award

Miscellaneous:
Computer Skills: Matlab, Stata, E-views, LaTeX
Languages: Spanish (Mother Tongue), English (Fluent), French (Intermediate)

Seminars and Conferences;
EEA Congress, Glasgow, 2010
XXV Jornadas de Economia Industrial, Getafe, 2010
XI SAET Conference, Faro, Portugal, 2011
ENTER Seminar at ECARES (ULB), Brussels, 2011
UC3M Student Seminar, Getafe, Madrid, 2011
Queen's University Management School, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK, 2011 (scheduled)
XXXVI Simposio de Análisis Económico, Málaga, 2011 (scheduled)

Research Papers:
Reputation with Endogenous Information (2011) (Job Market Paper)
I study a dynamic game between a principal, who has to take a decision every period, and an informed agent whose preferences over the decision are his private information. The decision maker cannot decide on the employment status of the agent but she has access to a costly monitoring technology that (potentially) allows her to learn whether the agent has revealed his information truthfully before taking a decision. I show that in any Markov Perfect Equilibrium the principal monitors less and the agent lies more often when the principal has long-run motivations if she believes that the agent is bad with sufficiently high probability. The reason is that when the type of the agent is uncertain, the principal can free-ride on his reputational concern, but once she discovers his type, this advantage is gone.

Information Acquisition and Communication in Networked Communications (2010)

This paper deals with information acquisition and communication in networked organizations. Agents receive private signals about a payoff-relevant parameter and may communicate it to other players to whom they are linked. We derive a key condition that ensures truthful communication and show that it is only satisfied if the original networked information structure belongs to either the regular or core-periphery topologies. Since the degree of substitution between the information one acquires and the information one obtains from his acquaintances depends on the truthfulness of communication, it turns

out that information acquisition is not monotonic on centrality.

Hotelling Competition for a Consumer with Unknown Taste (2011) with **Joaquín Coleff**

Incentives, Decision Making and Information Technology (2009)

Optimal Hierarchies for Project Selection Work in Progress

Communication and Voting Work in Progress

Last Edited: November, 7, 2011