Public Economics UC3M Incidence of Taxation

Based on Raj Chetty and Gregory A. Bruich

Fall 2015

- (Stiglitz 18, 482-497; AGZ 3.1 + 255-257; )
- Most of the slides here come from Raj Chetty. You might want to wacht his video: http://www.rajchetty.com/index.php/lecture-videos That is a graduate class, but I'm sure you can follow the first part of it.
- As an alternative to these slides you can study "Class Notes 3"

- Tax incidence is the study of the effects of tax policies on prices and the distribution of utilities
- What happens to market prices when a tax is introduced or changed?
  - Increase tax on cigarettes by \$1 per pack
  - Introduction of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
  - Food stamps program
- Effect on price → distributional effects on smokers, profits of producers, shareholders, farmers, ...

## Economic vs. Statutory Incidence(Raj Chetty)

- Equivalent when prices are constant but not in general
- Consider the following argument:
  - $\bullet\,$  Government should tax capital income b/c it is concentrated at the high end of the income distribution
- Neglects general equilibrium price effects
  - Tax might be shifted onto workers
  - If capital taxes  $\rightarrow$  less savings and capital flight, then capital stock may decline, driving return to capital up and wages down
  - Some argue that capital taxes are paid by workers and therefore *increase* income inequality (Hassett and Mathur 2009)

• Tax incidence is an example of positive analysis

- Typically the first step in policy evaluation
- An input into thinking about policies that maximize social welfare
- Theory is informative about signs and comparative statics but is inconclusive about magnitudes
  - Incidence of cigarette tax: elasticity of demand w.r.t. price is crucial
  - Labor vs. capital taxation: mobility of labor, capital are critical

- Ideally, we would characterize the effect of a tax change on utility levels of all agents in the economy
- Useful simplification in practice: aggregate economic agents into a few groups
- Incidence analyzed at a number of levels:
  - Producer vs. consumer (tax on cigarettes)
  - Source of income (labor vs. capital)
  - Income level (rich vs. poor)
  - Region or country (local property taxes)
  - Across generations (social security reform)

# Partial Equilibrium Incidence: Key Assumptions(Raj Chetty)

### Two good economy

- $\bullet\,$  Only one relative price  $\to$  partial and general equilibrium are same
- Can be viewed as an approx. of incidence in a multi-good model if
  - the market being taxed is "small"
  - there are no close substitutes/complements in the utility fn
- **2** Tax revenue is not spent on the taxed good
  - Tax revenue is used to buy untaxed good or thrown away

#### Perfect competition among producers

• Relaxed in some studies of monopolistic or oligopolistic markets

## Partial Equilibrium Model: Setup(Raj Chetty)

- Two goods: x and y
- Government levies an **excise** tax on good x
  - Excise or specific tax: levied on a quantity (e.g. gallon, pack, ton)
    Ad-valorem tax: fraction of prices (e.g. sales tax)
- Let *p* denote the pretax price of *x* and *q* = *p* + *t* denote the tax inclusive price of *x*
- Good y, the numeraire, is untaxed

• Consumer has wealth Z and has utility u(x, y)

• Let  $\varepsilon_D = \frac{\partial D}{\partial q} \frac{q}{D(q)} = \frac{\partial \log D}{\partial \log q}$  denote the price elasticity of demand

- $\bullet\,$  Elasticity: % change in quantity when price changes by 1%
- Widely used concept because elasticities are unit free

## Partial Equilibrium Model: Supply(Raj Chetty)

- Price-taking firms
- Use c(S) units of the numeraire y to produce S units of x
- Cost of production is increasing and convex:

$$c'(S) > 0$$
 and  $c''(S) \ge 0$ 

- Profit at pretax price p and level of supply S is pS c(S)
- With perfect optimization, the supply function for good x is implicitly defined by the marginal condition p = c'(S(p))
- Let  $\varepsilon_S = \frac{\partial S}{\partial p} \frac{p}{S(p)}$  denote the price elasticity of supply

## Partial Equilibrium Model: Equilibrium(Raj Chetty)


Equilibrium condition

$$Q = S(p) = D(p+t)$$


defines an equation p(t)

- Goal: characterize  $\frac{dp}{dt}$ , the effect of a tax increase on price
- First consider some graphical examples to build intuition, then analytically derive formula


#### **Tax Levied on Consumers**




**Tax Levied on Producers** 



#### Perfectly Inelastic Demand



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## Formula for Tax Incidence(Raj Chetty)

• Implicitly differentiate equilibrium condition

$$D(p+t) = S(p)$$

to obtain:

$$rac{dp}{dt} = rac{\partial D}{\partial p} rac{1}{(rac{\partial S}{\partial p} - rac{\partial D}{\partial p})} \ \Rightarrow rac{dp}{dt} = rac{arepsilon_D}{arepsilon_S - arepsilon_D}$$

Incidence on consumers:

$$rac{dq}{dt} = 1 + rac{dp}{dt} = rac{arepsilon_S}{arepsilon_S - arepsilon_D}$$

## Tax Incidence with Salience Effects(Raj Chetty)

- Central assumption of neoclassical model: taxes are equivalent to prices  $(\frac{dx}{dt} = \frac{dx}{dp})$
- In practice, are people fully aware of marginal tax rates?
- Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) test this assumption and generalize theory to allow for salience effects
- **Part 1:** Test whether "salience" (visibility of tax-inclusive price) affects behavioral responses to commodity taxation
  - Does effect of a tax on demand depend on whether it is included in **posted** price?
- **Part 2:** Develop formulas for incidence and efficiency costs of taxation that permit salience effects and other optimization errors

- [Evans, Ringel, and Stech 1999]: Cigarette excise taxes
- I [Hastings and Washington 2010]: Food stamps
- [Rothstein 2010]: Earned Income Tax Credit

- Question: How do cigarette tax increases affect prices?
  - Do they take money from cigarette companies or smokers?
- Partial equilibrium is a plausible approximation for cigarettes, so use that framework here

- Cigarettes taxed at both federal and state levels in U.S.
- Total revenue of about \$35 billion per year, similar to estate taxation
- Federal tax increased from \$0.39 to \$1.01 per pack in 2009
- Variation among states: from 30 cents per pack in VA to \$4.35 in NY in 2012
- Controversial commodity due to health and paternalism concerns

- Since 1975, more than 200 state tax changes  $\rightarrow$  natural experiments to investigate tax incidence
- Exploit these state-level changes in excise tax rates using simple diff-in-diff research designs
- Idea: Suppose federal govt. implements a tax change. Compare cigarette prices before and after the change

$$D = [P_{A1} - P_{A0}]$$

• Identification assumption: absent the tax change, there would have been no change in cigarette price

## Difference-in-Difference

• But what if price fluctuates because of climatic conditions or trends in demand?

 $\rightarrow$  First difference (and time series) estimate biased

• Can relax ID assumption using diff-in-diff

$$DD = [P_{A1} - P_{A0}] - [P_{B1} - P_{B0}]$$

- State A: experienced a tax change (treatment)
- State *B*: does not experience any tax change (control)
- Identifying assumption for DD: "parallel trends:" absent the policy change,  $P_1 P_0$  would have been the same for A and B

## Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Demand Elasticity

- Demand model estimate implies that:  $\varepsilon_D = -0.42$ 
  - $\rightarrow$  10% increase in price induces a 4.2% reduction in consumption
- How to compute price elasticity of demand when using variation arising from tax changes?
- Tax passed 1-1 onto consumers, so we can substitute  $\Delta P = \Delta T$  here
- Then compute  $\varepsilon_D$  from  $\hat{\beta} = (\Delta Q/Q)/\Delta T$  from regression coefficient of log demand on cigarette tax:

$$\varepsilon_D = \frac{P}{Q} \frac{\Delta Q}{\Delta T} = \hat{\beta} / P$$

with P (price) and Q (quantity) are sample means

- Use individual data to see who smokes by education group and income level
- Spending per capita decreases with the income level
- Tax is regressive on an absolute level (not only that share of taxes relative to income goes down)
- Conclusion: Taxes levied on cigarette companies lead to poor paying more for same goods, with no impact on companies!

## Cigarette Tax Incidence: Other Considerations

- Lifetime vs. current incidence (Poterba 1989)
  - Finds cigarette, gasoline and alcohol taxation are less regressive (in statutory terms) from a lifetime perspective
  - High corr. between income and cons share in cross-section; weaker corr. with permanent income.
- Behavioral models (Gruber and Koszegi 2004)
  - If agents have self control problems, incidence conc. on poor is beneficial to the extent that they smoke less
- Intensive vs. extensive margin: Adda and Cornaglia (2006)
  - Use data on cotinine (biomarker) levels in lungs to measure inhalation
  - Higher taxes lead to fewer cigarettes smoked but no effect on cotinine in lungs, implying longer inhalation of each cigarette

- Question: How does food stamps subsidy affect grocery store pricing?
- Food stamps typically arrive at the same time for a large group of people, e.g. first of the month
- Use this variation to study:
  - Whether demand changes at beginning of month (violating PIH)
  - e How much of the food stamp benefit is taken by firms by increased prices rather than consumers (intended recipients)

- Scanner data from several grocery stores in Nevada
- Data from stores in high-poverty areas (>15% food stamp recipients) and in low-poverty areas (<3%)</li>
- Club card data on whether each individual used food stamps
- Data from other states where food stamps are staggered across month used as a control
- Research design: use variation across stores, individuals, and time of month to measure pricing responses

- Demand increases by 30% in 1st week, prices by about 3%
- Very compelling because of multiple dimensions of tests: cross-individual, cross-store, cross-category, and cross-state
- Interesting theoretical implication: subsidies in markets where low-income recipients are pooled with others have better distributional effects
  - May favor food stamps as a way to transfer money to low incomes relative to a subsidy such as the EITC

- How does EITC affect wages?
- EITC payments subsidize work and transfer money to low income working individuals (\$50 bil/year)
- This subsidy could be taken by employers by shifting wage
  - Ex: inelastic demand for low-skilled labor and elastic supply  $\rightarrow$  wage rate adjusts 1-1 with EITC
- Policy question: are we actually transferring money to low incomes through this program or are we just helping business owners?

- Rothstein considers a model of the labor market with three types of agents
  - Employers
  - 2 EITC-eligible workers
  - EITC-ineligible workers
- Extends standard partial eq incidence model to allow for differentiated labor supply and different tax rates across demographic groups
- Heterogeneity both complicates the analysis and permits identification
- Identification strategy: compare wage changes across groups who were affected differently by expansions of EITC program from 1992-94

- Basic DFL comparisons yield perverse result: groups that benefited from EITC and started working more had more wage growth
- Potential explanation: demand curve shifted differentially higher demand for low skilled workers in 1990s.
- To deal with this, repeats same analysis for 1989-1992 (no EITC expansion) and takes differences
- Changes sign back to expected, but imprecisely estimated

## Rothstein: Results

- Ultimately uses quantity estimates and incidence formula to back out predicted changes
  - Wage elasticity estimates: 0.7 for labor supply, -0.3 for labor demand
- Implications using formulas from model:
  - EITC-eligible workers gain \$0.70 per \$1 EITC expansion
  - Employers gain about \$0.70
  - EITC-ineligible low-skilled workers lose about \$0.40
- On net, achieve only \$0.30 of redistribution toward low income individuals for every \$1 of EITC

- Identification heavily complicated by recession, trends (SBTC); no clean control group
- Oata limitations: no panel data; problems in measurement no annual income, cannot measure MTR
- Short run vs. long run effects; important due to evidence of nominal wage rigidities.
- Pure extensive-margin analysis. Intensive margin would go the other way b/c EITC is not a marginal subsidy to wage for a very large fraction of the population.