

# Computational Appendix: Altruistically-Motivated Transfers Under Uncertainty

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Many of the methods we use to compute a solution to the continuous-time dynamic Markov game can be demonstrated by showing how to solve a standard consumption-smoothing problem in continuous time.

In particular, section 1 shows how to compute policy functions for a single decision maker (or equivalently many decision makers with perfect altruism) and distributions of households over the state space resulting from these policies and an initial distribution. Section 2 augments section 1 with the elements needed to compute the equilibrium of the paper – transfers only flow when the recipient is broke – when there are two decision makers with imperfect altruism for each other. Section 3 then shows how to adapt the altruism model to an overlapping-generations framework and a finite-horizon economy, as well as how to augment the model by an endogenous risk-taking decision or other choices.

Matlab-code for the single-agent consumption-savings problem as well as the altruism model (and some of its extensions) is available on our websites, see the respective passages of this appendix for references to the code. The code uses an object with a large number of generalized routines for continuous-time finite-element methods, see `Doc.FinE10bj.pdf` for documentation.

## 1 A Consumption-Smoothing Problem

Consider the problem of a consumer with initial wealth  $W_0 \geq 0$  and a stochastic income stream with time-dependent mean  $y_t$  and standard deviation  $\sigma$  who has access to a safe asset.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>We work with a time-dependent problem because it highlights the workings of the Markov-chain method.

consumer chooses a consumption function  $c(t, W_t)$  to maximize:

$$\begin{aligned} & E_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & dW_t = (rW_t + y_t - c_t)dt + \sigma dB_t \\ & c \geq 0, \quad W \geq 0, \quad W_0 \text{ given.} \end{aligned}$$

where  $W$  stands for wealth,  $r$  for the return on a risk-free asset,  $y$  for flow income,  $c$  for consumption, and  $\sigma$  is the per-period standard deviation of income and  $B_t$  is standard Brownian motion.<sup>2</sup> Per-period utility is CRRA, i.e.  $u(c) = c^{1-\gamma}/(1-\gamma)$  with  $\gamma > 0$ .

The code for the consumption-savings problem can be found in `Bewley_main.m` in the folder `Bewley`.

## 1.1 Deriving the HJB

We first heuristically derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) for the continuous-time setting. This derivation will highlight the connection of the numerical-approximation method to the underlying continuous-time problem.

We start by thinking about a discrete-time problem in which time is chopped up into small intervals of size  $\Delta t$ . Using Bellman's principle, we separate the consumption-smoothing problem into a  $\Delta t$ -horizon problem where we take the continuation value  $V$  of the problem as of time  $t + \Delta t$  as given:

$$\begin{aligned} V(t, W_t) &= \max_{c_t} \{u(c_t)\Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t})\} \\ & \text{s.t.} \quad W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t = \underbrace{(rW_t + y_t - c_t)}_{\equiv a(t, W_t)} \Delta t + \sigma \Delta B_t \\ & c \geq 0, \quad W \geq 0, \quad W_0 \text{ given.} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Now, take a second-order Taylor approximation of  $V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t})$  in  $\Delta t$  around  $(t, W_t)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}) - V(t, W_t) &\approx V_t(t, W_t)\Delta t + V_W(t, W_t)(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t) + V_{tt}\Delta t^2 \\ &+ \frac{1}{2}V_{WW}(t, W_t)(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t)^2 + V_{tW}(t, W_t)\Delta t(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t) \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Apply the rules of stochastic calculus to the cross products:

$$\begin{aligned} (W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t)^2 &\approx \sigma^2 \Delta t \\ \Delta t(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t) &\approx \sigma \Delta t \Delta B_t \end{aligned}$$

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<sup>2</sup>Note that in practice we have to ensure that the variance of the Brownian motion becomes small as wealth goes to zero in order to ensure that wealth remains non-negative. This can be done by having the variance depend on wealth, e.g.  $\sigma W$ .

Substitute these into (2), take the expected value, divide by  $\Delta t$  and drop terms of order lower than  $\Delta t$ :

$$E_t \left[ \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}) - V(t, W_t)}{\Delta t} \right] \approx V_t(t, W_t) + a(t, W_t)V_W(t, W_t) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}V_{WW}(t, W_t)$$

Now, in (1) approximate  $e^{-\rho\Delta t}$  by  $1 - \rho\Delta t$  and subtract  $V(t, W_t)$  on both sides to obtain

$$\rho E_t(V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}))\Delta t = \max_c \{u(c)\Delta t + E_t(V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}) - V(t, W_t))\}.$$

Finally, divide by  $\Delta t$  and take the limit as  $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$  to obtain the HJB:

$$-V_t(t, W_t) = -\rho V(t, W_t) + \max_c \left\{ u(c) + V_W(t, W_t)a(t, W_t) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}V_{WW}(t, W_t) \right\}. \quad (3)$$

## 1.2 The $\Delta t$ -Problem

We describe the numerical solution method to (1) in three stages: First for  $\sigma = 0$  (no risk), second for  $\sigma > 0$  (transitory risk), and finally we introduce persistent earnings risk by letting  $y_t$  follow a discrete-state Markov process (Poisson process). Throughout, the grid for the state variable  $W$  is uniformly spaced with mesh size denoted by  $\Delta W$ . The solution method consists of iterating backward on the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This is analogous to value function iteration in discrete time.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.3 Backward Equation: $\sigma = 0$

We start from Bellman's principle given in (1), supposing that we know the value function  $V$  as of time  $t + \Delta t$  on the discretized state space. For all points off the grid, the values are linearly interpolated and denoted by  $\tilde{V}$ , using interpolation weights  $\omega^+$  and  $\omega^-$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}) = & V(t + \Delta t, W) + \omega^+[V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)] - \\ & - \omega^- [V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)] \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where  $W$  is a grid point and  $W_{t+\Delta t}$  results from the budget constraint. The interpolation weights contain the influence of the decision maker on the direction of the state and are given by

$$\omega^+ = \max\left(\frac{a\Delta t}{\Delta W}, 0\right) \quad \text{and} \quad \omega^- = \max\left(-\frac{a\Delta t}{\Delta W}, 0\right).$$

If the drift  $a$  is positive, the household is saving so that the state moves in an upward (+) direction. Vice versa, if the household consumes more than her current income, wealth decreases and the state moves downward (-).

<sup>3</sup>As in discrete time, it is also possible to iterate on the Euler equation in continuous time. For our altruism problem, however, this is not practical because consumption policies have discontinuities.

We substitute the linear interpolation (4) for the continuation value in (1). Furthermore, we approximate  $e^{-\rho\Delta t}$  by  $1 - \rho\Delta t$  in (1). Ignoring the max-operator for now, the  $\Delta t$ -problem is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V(t, W) \approx & u(c)\Delta t + (1 - \rho\Delta t)V(t + \Delta t, W) + \\ & + (1 - \rho\Delta t)\omega^+[V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)] - \\ & - (1 - \rho\Delta t)\omega^-[V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)]. \end{aligned}$$

Next, we can approximate  $V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) - V(\cdot, W) \approx V_W(\cdot, W)\Delta W$ , where  $V_W$  is the partial derivative of  $V$  with respect to  $W$ . Using this we see that terms like  $\rho\Delta t[V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) - V(\cdot, W)]$  are of second order and can be neglected<sup>4</sup>. With this in mind we can write:

$$\begin{aligned} -[V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t, W)] \approx & -\rho\Delta tV(t + \Delta t, W) + u(c)\Delta t + \\ & + \omega^+[V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)] - \\ & - \omega^-[V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)]. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, substitute the expressions for  $\omega^+$  and  $\omega^-$  and divide through by  $\Delta t$ :

$$\begin{aligned} -\left[\frac{V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t, W)}{\Delta t}\right] \approx & -\rho V(t + \Delta t, W) + u(c) + \tag{5} \\ & + \left[\frac{V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)}{\Delta W}\right] a^+(t, W) - \\ & - \left[\frac{V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W}\right] a^-(t, W) \end{aligned}$$

where we define the positive and negative parts of drift  $a$  as

$$a^+(t, W) = \max(a(t, W), 0), \quad a^-(t, W) = \max(-a(t, W), 0).$$

In (5), we recognize a finite-difference approximation of the continuous-time HJB (3), leaving the max-operator aside for now.

Equation (5) is of central importance since it tells us how the value function changes along the time dimension, specifically, *backward* in time. Note that the left-hand side is a numerical approximation to  $-V_t(t, W)$  and the right-hand side is known. Using this information we update the value function by moving a  $\Delta t$ -period in the backward direction:

$$V(t, W) \approx V(t + \Delta t, W) - V_t(t, W)\Delta t.$$

If we are interested in computing a stationary solution we continue to iterate backward until time does not play a role anymore, that is, until  $V_t$  is close to zero everywhere on the grid.

In order to fully understand equation (5), note that the quotients on the right-hand side in

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<sup>4</sup>In the algorithm,  $\Delta t$  linearly decreases as  $\Delta W$  gets smaller, so we see that the term in question is of order  $\Delta W^2$ . Terms of second order can in general be neglected.

the square brackets correspond to the numerical approximation of the partial derivative  $V_W$ . That is,

$$V_W \approx \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)}{\Delta W} \quad \text{and} \quad V_W \approx \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W}$$

are the forward and backward first order difference quotients in  $W$  respectively. This way of computing partial derivatives numerically is referred to as *upwind differencing* since differences are taken in the direction the system is moving. We can see that whether the forward or backward difference is used in order to approximate  $V_W$  depends on the flow of the economy. If  $a \geq 0$ , then the forward difference is used. When  $a < 0$ , we use the backward difference.<sup>5</sup>

A final note is in order. In order for the interpolation coefficients to be well defined the following well-known stability condition needs to hold:

$$\frac{a(t, W)\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \leq 1.$$

This is the so-called *Courant-Friedrich-Lax condition* (CFL). So whenever crazy things happen, check this condition! Of course,  $\Delta t$  can – and should – always be chosen small enough in order for this condition to hold.

#### 1.4 Backward Equation: $\sigma > 0$

We now proceed analogously for the case when  $\sigma > 0$ . Once again, the value function  $V$  is assumed to be known as of time  $t + \Delta t$  on the discretized state space.

When Brownian motion is present, in principle the state  $W_{t+\Delta t}$  can take on values potentially far away from the current level of wealth  $W_t$ . Fortunately, it has been shown that the true process can be well approximated with a three-state Markov chain which takes on values on the grid. The approximating process has the property that its value either stays at the same grid point with probability  $\pi_m$ , jumps up to the next-higher grid point with probability  $\pi_u$ , or jumps down to the next-lower grid point with probability  $\pi_d$ . The probabilities are pinned down by requiring it to share the same first two moments of the true process.<sup>6</sup>

The probabilities are then used to approximate the continuation value as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{E}_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}) &= \pi_m V(t + \Delta t, W) + \pi_u V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) + \pi_d V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W) \\ &= V(t + \Delta t, W) + \pi_u [V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)] - \\ &\quad - \pi_d [V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)], \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

<sup>5</sup>Upwind differencing is often advocated as the preferred way to compute derivatives since information enters from the direction the system is moving to. Below we briefly outline *centered differencing* as another way to compute derivatives.

<sup>6</sup>This method is in spirit comparable to Tauchen (1986) and is studied by, for example, Dupuis and Kushner (2001, *Numerical Methods for Stochastic Problems in Continuous Time*). They show that for the approximating process to converge to the true process as  $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$  it is enough to ensure that the Markov transition probabilities given by  $\pi_m$ ,  $\pi_u$ , and  $\pi_d$ , are *locally consistent* (i.e. they have the same first and second moments as the underlying process).

where we denote the expectation operator by  $\tilde{E}$  to suggest that this constitutes an approximation to the true value function. In order to pin down the transition probabilities we proceed in two steps: (i) Set the drift to zero, and (ii) set the Brownian motion to zero.

#### 1.4.1 Approximating Brownian Motion

With the drift set to zero, the law of motion consists only of Brownian motion. In order to approximate this process we choose probabilities  $\pi_u, \pi_d$  and  $\pi_m$  in order to match the first and second moments of the Brownian motion:

$$\begin{aligned} E(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t) &= \pi_u \Delta W - \pi_d \Delta W = 0, \\ E[(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t)^2] &= \pi_u (\Delta W)^2 + \pi_d (\Delta W)^2 = \sigma^2 \Delta t. \end{aligned}$$

Solving these two equations for the two unknowns:

$$\pi_u = \pi_d \equiv p = \frac{\sigma^2 \Delta t}{2(\Delta W)^2}.$$

In order for the probabilities to be positive, again a stability condition (the CFL) has to hold. That is, in order to ensure that  $\pi_m \geq 0$ , we need to have that:

$$\frac{\sigma^2 \Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \leq 1.$$

Note that the *binomial* approximation method arises as a special case when  $\Delta t$  is set such that  $\pi_m = 0$ . In this case  $p = 1/2$ .

#### 1.4.2 Adding Back the Drift

Now set the Brownian motion to zero. Looking back at (4) and interpreting the interpolation weights as transition probabilities shows that we have already done the work. Suppose, for example, that the drift equals zero. Then,  $\pi_m = 1$  and the household remains at the same level of wealth a  $\Delta t$ -period later. When the drift is positive, we take away probability mass from the middle and shift it upward. Vice versa, probability mass is shifted downward when the drift is negative.

We now add back the drift to the Brownian-motion process, which itself has no drift. To do this, we shift probability mass from the middle up- or downward. The transition probabilities then become:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(W, W + \Delta W) &\equiv \pi_u = p + \omega^+ = \frac{\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \left( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \Delta W a^+(t, W) \right) \\ \pi(W, W - \Delta W) &\equiv \pi_d = p + \omega^- = \frac{\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \left( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \Delta W a^-(t, W) \right) \\ \pi(W, W) &\equiv \pi_m = 1 - \pi_u - \pi_d \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Of course, we have to ensure again that all probabilities are positive. Again,  $\Delta t$  has to be chosen small enough such that  $\pi_m \geq 0$ .

We will now show again that these probabilities lead to an interpretation of the discretized HJB in finite differences. Substituting  $p$  and the  $\omega$ 's into (6), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{E}_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}) = & V(\cdot, W) + p [V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) + V(\cdot, W - \Delta W) - 2V(\cdot, W)] + \\ & + \omega^+ [V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) - V(\cdot, W)] - \omega^- [V(\cdot, W) - V(\cdot, W - \Delta W)]. \end{aligned}$$

The expression

$$p [V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) + V(\cdot, W - \Delta W) - 2V(\cdot, W)] = \frac{\sigma^2 \Delta t}{2} \left[ \frac{V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) + V(\cdot, W - \Delta W) - 2V(\cdot, W)}{(\Delta W)^2} \right]$$

involves the second-order difference quotient in  $W$ , which approximates the second derivative of  $V$  with respect to  $W$ . The terms related to the  $\omega$ 's are the same forward and backward first-order difference quotients in  $W$  as for the deterministic case in (5).

We now get the analogous equation to (5) by following the same steps which led up to (5), except that the term related to the uncertainty is now included:

$$\begin{aligned} - \left[ \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t, W)}{\Delta t} \right] \approx & -\rho V(t + \Delta t, W) + u(c) + \tag{8} \\ & + \left[ \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W)}{\Delta W} \right] a^+(t, W) - \\ & - \left[ \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W) - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W} \right] a^-(t, W) + \\ & + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[ \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W) + V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W) - 2V(t + \Delta t, W)}{(\Delta W)^2} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

We again recognize a finite-difference version of the continuous-time HJB (3) here, leaving the max-operator aside for later.

The significance of (8), just like that of (5), is that it provides information on how the value function changes going backward in time. The backward-iteration steps for the value function are again given by

$$V(t, W) \approx V(t + \Delta t, W_t) - V_t(t, W_t) \Delta t.$$

In order to compute a stationary solution, we iterate until  $V_t$  is close to zero on the entire grid.

### 1.4.3 Centered Differencing

We now briefly describe a different method of dealing with the drift term. Note that we can directly approximate  $dW = a(t, W)dt + \sigma dB_t$  on the trinomial lattice, pinning down the probabilities by requiring a three-state Markov chain to have the correct mean and variance, an

approach similar to Tauchen (1986):

$$\begin{aligned} E(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t) &= \pi_u \Delta W - \pi_d \Delta W = a(t, W) \Delta t, \\ E[(W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t)^2] &= \pi_u (\Delta W)^2 + \pi_d (\Delta W)^2 = \sigma^2 \Delta t, \\ \pi_m &= 1 - \pi_u - \pi_d. \end{aligned}$$

From the first equation we get  $\pi_d = \pi_u - (a(t, W) \Delta t) / \Delta W$ , and from the second equation we obtain  $\pi_d = (\sigma^2 \Delta t) / (\Delta W)^2 - \pi_u$ . From this it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_u &= \frac{\Delta t}{2(\Delta W)^2} [\sigma^2 + a(t, W) \Delta W], \\ \pi_d &= \frac{\Delta t}{2(\Delta W)^2} [\sigma^2 - a(t, W) \Delta W]. \end{aligned}$$

So this approach shifts probability away from the bottom (and not from the middle) and shifts it to the top. Again, we have  $\pi_m = 1 - \pi_u - \pi_d$  and we have to respect the obvious stability condition.

Following the same steps as above, we find a version of (8) (not shown here) in which forward and backward first-order difference quotients in  $W$  are replaced by first-order *centered* difference quotient  $[V(t, W + \Delta W) - V(t, W - \Delta W)] / 2 \approx V_W(t, W)$ .<sup>7</sup>

## 1.5 Optimal Consumption

We now turn towards the resolution of the max-operator in the HJB and answer the question: How is optimal consumption computed using the method of upwind differencing?

First, we group the terms of (8) in which the control variable  $c$  enters into the function

$$\mathcal{H}(c) \equiv u(c) + a^+(t, W) \left[ \frac{V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) - V(\cdot, W)}{\Delta W} \right] - a^-(t, W) \left[ \frac{V(\cdot, W) - V(\cdot, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W} \right].$$

The household maximizes  $\mathcal{H}$  by choosing  $c \geq 0$ . Note that when varying  $c$ , flow utility changes as well as the drift of wealth (i.e. the savings rate), describing the familiar consumption-savings trade-off.

If the household saves, then  $a^- = 0$  and the household's marginal value of saving is evaluated using the forward difference in  $W$ . If it dis-saves, then  $a^+ = 0$  and the household's marginal value of saving is evaluated using the backward difference. Finally, if  $a^- = 0 = a^+$  consumption equals income and the wealth position of the household remains unchanged. In order to find optimal consumption, let  $c$  vary on  $(0, \infty)$  and choose the one which leads to the largest value of  $\mathcal{H}$ .

In order to find a simple formula for this, define the following smooth, strictly concave func-

<sup>7</sup>If the true value function is differentiable then both are of course the same in the limit as  $\Delta W \rightarrow 0$ . If there are kinks in the true value function, then the upwind method is preferable since it takes into account the relevant directional derivatives, whereas the finite-difference method takes a (usually meaningless) average between the two directional derivatives.

tions in  $c$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{H}^+(c) &\equiv u(c) - c \left[ \frac{V(\cdot, W + \Delta W) - V(\cdot, W)}{\Delta W} \right] + \text{constant} \\ \mathcal{H}^-(c) &\equiv u(c) - c \left[ \frac{V(\cdot, W) - V(\cdot, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W} \right] + \text{constant}.\end{aligned}$$

Compute the unconstrained maximizers  $c^{*+}$  for  $\mathcal{H}^+$  and  $c^{*-}$  for  $\mathcal{H}^-$ , respectively, using the first order condition. If  $c^{*+} \leq rW + y$ , then  $c^* \equiv c^{*+}$  is a forward maximizer. If  $c^{*-} > rW + y$  then  $c^{*-} \equiv c^{*-}$  is a backward maximizer. If there exists only a forward maximizer (or only a backward maximizer), then this maximizer constitutes the optimal consumption rate. If none of the two exists, then  $c^* = rW + y$ , i.e. the consumer should stick with the current wealth level. If both maximizers exist, choose the one which yields a higher  $\mathcal{H}$ . The last case does not arise in the case that  $V(t + \Delta t, \cdot)$  is concave in wealth.

## 1.6 Constraints and grid boundaries

The method described so far works for points that are inside the  $W$ -grid. We now turn to procedures for what to do on the margins of the grid.

At the uppermost grid point for  $W$  (call it  $\bar{W}$ ), we face the difficulty that we do not know the value function at  $\bar{W} + \Delta W$ . There are two ways to deal with this: First, one can extrapolate the value function (say by requiring the third derivative to be constant, as we do in our code). Second, one can reflect agents back into the grid in case they receive a positive shock and jump out. This amounts to adding our previous value for  $\pi_u$  to  $\pi_m$  and setting  $\pi_u = 0$ . In our computations, we find that extrapolation leads to better approximations for policies and value functions close to the grid boundary; this is because reflection rules out upside risk at  $\bar{W}$ . However, reflection turns out to be the more stable method, especially once altruism is added into the setting. This is presumably the case because reflection induces a meaningful economic game on a discrete, bounded grid, whereas extrapolation does not. When using the reflection method, we have to make sure that agents are very unlikely to reach the regions in the state space where the influence of the boundary is apparent. This can always be ensured by choosing a large-enough grid for  $W$ .

At the bottom grid point  $W = 0$ , we have to check if agents are constrained. To do this, we compute the optimal consumption policy given the forward derivative  $[V(t + \Delta t, \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, 0)]/\Delta W$ . If this consumption is feasible, then it constitutes the optimal consumption policy: The agent is unconstrained and saves. If it is not feasible, then the optimal consumption policy is to consume the entire income and stay at  $W = 0$ . As mentioned before, it is important to impose an income-shock process that vanishes as  $W$  goes to zero (such as  $\sigma W dB_t$ ) in order to avoid complications at the boundary.

## 1.7 Persistent income shocks: Poisson Process for $y$

We now allow  $y_t$  to follow a discrete-state Markov chain. For simplicity, consider a two-state Markov chain with  $y \in \{y^b, y^g\}$ , where  $y^b < y^g$ , and Poisson rate  $\eta$ . This means that the probability of switching from one income state to the other over a time interval  $\Delta t$  is approximately  $\eta\Delta t$ . The value function is now also a function of  $y_t$ . We maintain the value function's dependence on  $t$  since we use backward iteration again.

Suppose again that we know  $V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^g)$  and  $V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^b)$ . The  $\Delta t$ -problem for a household who currently has an income endowment  $y^g$  is given by:

$$V(t, W_t, y^g) = \max_{c_t} \left\{ u(c_t)\Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \left[ \eta\Delta t E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^b) + (1 - \eta\Delta t) E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^g) \right] \right\}$$

$$\text{s.t. } W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t = \underbrace{(rW_t + y^g - c_t)}_{\equiv a(t, W_t, y^g)} \Delta t + \sigma \Delta B_t$$

$$c \geq 0, \quad W \geq 0, \quad W_0 \text{ given.}$$

We now derive the HJB, which will show us that the numerical approximation for this case is practically the same as for (3).

Using a Taylor approximation for  $e^{-\rho\Delta t} \approx 1 - \rho\Delta t$  and canceling terms in  $(\Delta t)^2$ , we find that

$$V(t, W_t, y^g) = u(c_t)\Delta t + \eta\Delta t \left[ E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^b) - E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^g) \right] + (1 - \rho\Delta t) E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^g)$$

We now expand  $V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y) = V(t + \Delta t, W_t, y) + a(t, W_t, y)\Delta t V_W(t + \Delta t, W_t, y)$  and drop terms in  $(\Delta t)^2$  to find

$$V(t, W_t, y^g) = u(c_t)\Delta t + \eta\Delta t \left[ V(t + \Delta t, W_t, y^b) - V(t + \Delta t, W_t, y^g) \right] + (1 - \rho\Delta t) E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^g).$$

Here, we recognize Bellman's principle from the case with transitory income risk: When crossing out the term in  $\eta\Delta t$ , we are back to Bellman's principle for constant  $y$ . Thus the above expression gives us the recipe to adjust our algorithm from before (for  $\sigma > 0$ ) to a persistent income process: We just have to introduce a new jump probability of  $\eta\Delta t$  to the point  $(t + \Delta t, W_t, y_b)$ , which takes into account the risk of a change in  $y$ . We then have to subtract  $\eta\Delta t$  from  $\pi_m$  – recall that  $\pi_m$  is the probability of ending up at  $(t + \Delta t, W_t, y_g)$ . The probabilities  $\pi_u$  and  $\pi_d$  for moving up or down in the  $W$ -direction are not affected. Notice that the above derivation shows that we do not have to be concerned about interactions between  $y$  and  $W$  as  $\Delta t$  gets small, i.e. we do not have to include jumps to the point  $(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W, y_b)$  and the like.

We now proceed to derive the continuous-time HJB. Re-arranging the above, dividing by  $\Delta t$  and then letting  $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$  we find

$$\rho V(t, W_t, y^g) = u(c_t) + \eta \left[ V(t, W_t, y^b) - V(t, W_t, y^g) \right] + \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \left[ \frac{E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, y^g) - V(t, W_t, y^g)}{\Delta t} \right].$$

We see that the last term is the same as in the previous derivation of the HJB shown by (3). Thus, the HJB for the persistent income process is given by:

$$-V_t(t, W_t, y^g) = -\rho V(t, W_t, y^g) + \eta [V(t, W_t, y^b) - V(t, W_t, y^g)] + \tag{9}$$

$$+ \max_c \left\{ u(c) + V_W(t, W_t, y^g) a(t, W_t, y^g) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} V_{WW}(t, W_t, y^g) \right\}.$$

Thus, computing the change of the value function along the time dimension,  $V_t$ , follows (8) but includes the additional term due to the possibility of transiting from income state  $y^g$  to  $y^b$ , which is taken into account through the difference in the respective value functions, multiplied by the Poisson rate  $\eta$ .

In order to solve the problem we iterate backward on the two value functions, which again shows us that the Markov-chain method has an interpretation as a finite-difference method:

$$V(t - \Delta t, W_{t-\Delta t}, y^g) \approx V(t, W_t, y^g) - V_t(t, W_t, y^g) \Delta t$$

$$V(t - \Delta t, W_{t-\Delta t}, y^b) \approx V(t, W_t, y^b) - V_t(t, W_t, y^b) \Delta t.$$

## 1.8 Computing densities: The forward equation

In this section we briefly explain how we compute the (stationary and non-stationary) density of agents over the state space, here for the case where  $y$  is constant. Suppose we know the distribution of a mass of households at time 0, given by a density function  $n(0, W)$ . Furthermore, the optimal policies computed above provide a law of motion for the households:

$$dW_t = a(W_t)dt + \sigma dB_t.$$

The goal is to find the density function  $n(t, W)$  of households over the state space at each point in time  $t > 0$  that results from the initial density and the law of motion.

To do this, we will just map forward the density on our grid using the transition probabilities we derived before. So the method amounts to computing the density evolution for a discrete-state Markov chain in discrete time, which may be represented by

$$N'_{t+\Delta t} = N'_t P_t$$

where  $P_t$  is an  $n \times n$  transition matrix and  $N_t$  is an  $n \times 1$  vector whose  $i$ th element is the probability of being in state  $i$  at time  $t$ . The matrix  $P_t$  contains three non-zero elements per column, which are given by the transition probabilities  $(\pi_u, \pi_m, \pi_d)$  for the respective  $(W, t)$  position and are in the three positions around the diagonal.<sup>8</sup>

If we have time-invariant policy functions, then  $P_t$  is time-invariant. We can then find the

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<sup>8</sup>There is an interesting connection to value-function iteration here. On the discretized state space, value-function iteration may be expressed as  $V_t = u(c_t)\Delta t + P_t V_{t+\Delta t}$  in matrix form. So we see that the forward operator is the transpose of the backward operator. This translates to the forward partial-differentiable operator being the *adjoint* operator (a generalized transpose) of the backward partial-differential operator.

stationary distribution by iterating on the above until  $N_{t+\Delta t} = N_t$  (according to some convergence criterion).

We now state the *Kolmogorov forward equation* for our problem, which is the continuous-time analogon to the matrix operation above. It is a partial differential equation that tells us a law that the density function  $n(t, W)$  has to obey:

$$N_t(t, W) = -a_W(t, W)N(t, W) - a(t, W)N_W(t, W) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}N_{WW}(t, W). \quad (10)$$

In order to explain the intuition behind this equation we first set  $\sigma = 0$ . In this case the forward equation can be written as:

$$N_t(t, W) + a(t, W)N_W(t, W) = -a_W(t, W)N(t, W).$$

In order to understand what this equation says consider the characteristic curve of a single household. Parameterize the household's level of wealth by  $t$ :

$$W(t) = W_0 + \int_0^t a(s, W)ds.$$

Now take the total derivative of the parameterized density function with respect to  $t$

$$\frac{dN(t, W(t))}{dt} = N_t(t, W(t)) + a(t, W(t))N_W(t, W(t))$$

which is the left-hand side of the forward equation in the case without Brownian motion. So on the left-hand side, we have the change in the density when following an agent on his optimal path. It turns out that the growth in the density along this “characteristic curve” depends on how the drift looks like in the “neighborhood”, which we see on the right-hand side. For example, if  $a_W = 0$  then the density doesn't change along the characteristic curve. But if  $a_W > 0$  the drift is increasing in wealth and the density diverges along the characteristic curve, that is, the density becomes “less dense” over time.

Next, consider the case in which there is only Brownian motion but no drift. In this case, the Kolmogorov forward equation is given by

$$N_t(t, W) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2}N_{WW}(t, W),$$

which also goes by the name *heat equation* since it tells us how heat spreads in a material. If the density is convex it will become increasingly dense over time. In our model, if there are more agents both above and below the current  $W$ , then purely random movements will tend to even out the density at this point. On the other hand, if the density is linear, then  $N_{WW} = 0$  so that  $N_t = 0$  and the density is stationary.

### 1.8.1 Numerical implementation and connection to forward equation

Over a short time interval  $\Delta t$ , a household can jump to  $(t + \Delta t, W)$  coming from three possible points on the grid:  $(t, W)$ ,  $(t, W + \Delta W)$ ,  $(t, W - \Delta W)$  with Markov transition probabilities given by  $\pi_m$ ,  $\pi_d$  and  $\pi_u$ , respectively:

$$N(t + \Delta t, W) \approx \pi_d(t, W + \Delta W)N(t, W + \Delta W) + \pi_m(t, W)N(t, W) + \pi_u(t, W - \Delta W)N(t, W - \Delta W) \quad (11)$$

Note that the probabilities are written as a function of the grid point the economy is coming from.

In order to see that (11) approximates the Kolmogorov forward equation (10), begin by substituting

$$\pi_m(t, W) = 1 - \pi_u(t, W) - \pi_d(t, W)$$

and add and subtract terms as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} N(t + \Delta t, W) - N(t, W) &\approx \pi_d(t, W + \Delta W) [N(t, W + \Delta W) - N(t, W)] + \\ &+ \pi_u(t, W - \Delta W) [N(t, W - \Delta W) - N(t, W)] + \\ &+ N(t, W) [\pi_d(t, W + \Delta W) - \pi_d(t, W)] + \\ &+ N(t, W) [\pi_u(t, W - \Delta W) - \pi_u(t, W)] \end{aligned}$$

Substituting (7), dividing through by  $\Delta t \Delta W$  and taking the limit as  $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$  we get:

$$\begin{aligned} N_t(t, W) &= - \left[ \frac{N(t, W) - N(t, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W} \right] a^+(t, W) + \left[ \frac{N(t, W + \Delta W) - N(t, W)}{\Delta W} \right] a^-(t, W) - \\ &- \left[ \frac{a^+(t, W) - a^+(t, W - \Delta W)}{\Delta W} \right] N(t, W) + \left[ \frac{a^-(t, W + \Delta W) - a^-(t, W)}{\Delta W} \right] N(t, W) + \\ &+ \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[ \frac{N(t, W + \Delta W) + N(t, W - \Delta W) - 2N(t, W)}{(\Delta W)^2} \right] \end{aligned}$$

which is a numerical approximation to the Kolmogorov forward equation (10). Finally, it gives us another, equivalent, way to compute the density a  $\Delta t$ -period in the future:

$$N(t + \Delta t, W) \approx N(t, W) + N_t(t, W)\Delta t.$$

## 2 Altruism model

In our Markov-perfect environment, computing a solution to a consumption-smoothing problem when agents are imperfectly altruistic is very similar to the previous examples, which we consider an important strength. The following shows how to adapt the numerical algorithm to the altruistic framework. The code can be found in `AltruismUncert_main.m` in the folder

Altruism.

## 2.1 The $\Delta t$ -Problem

The payoff-relevant state – in the absence of shocks to  $(y, y')$  – consists of  $(t, W, W')$ . The  $\Delta t$ -problem, given a Markov strategy  $\{c', g'\}$  of the other player, is

$$\begin{aligned}
 V(t, W_t, W'_t) &= \max_{c, g} \{u(c)\Delta t + \alpha u(c')\Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} E_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, W'_{t+\Delta t})\} \quad (12) \\
 &\text{s.t.} \\
 W_{t+\Delta t} - W_t &= \underbrace{(rW_t + y_t + g'_t - c_t - g_t)}_{\equiv a(t, W_t, W'_t)} \Delta t + \sigma \Delta B_t \\
 W'_{t+\Delta t} - W'_t &= \underbrace{(rW'_t + y'_t + g_t - c'_t - g'_t)}_{\equiv a'(t, W_t, W'_t)} \Delta t + \sigma' \Delta B'_t \\
 c &\geq 0, \quad g \geq 0, \quad W \geq 0, \quad W_t, W'_t \text{ given.}
 \end{aligned}$$

Suppose again that we have  $V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, W'_{t+\Delta t})$  and  $V'(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, W'_{t+\Delta t})$  given, that is, the values are known on the grid. It turns out that it is enough to put together jumps in the  $W$ -direction for her and in the  $W'$ -direction for him.<sup>9</sup> Specifically, a household which is currently in state  $(t, W, W')$  can jump over a small time interval  $\Delta t$  to five possible points on the grid:

$$(t+\Delta t, W, W'), (t+\Delta t, W+\Delta W, W'), (t+\Delta t, W-\Delta W, W'), (t+\Delta t, W, W'+\Delta W), (t+\Delta t, W, W'-\Delta W)$$

with Markov transition probabilities given by  $\pi_m, \pi_u, \pi_d, \pi'_u$  and  $\pi'_d$ , respectively. Analogously to (6) these probabilities are used to approximate values off the grid:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \tilde{E}_t V(t + \Delta t, W_{t+\Delta t}, W'_{t+\Delta t}) &= \pi_m V(t + \Delta t, W, W') + \pi_u V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W, W') + \\
 &\quad + \pi_d V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W, W') + \pi'_u V(t + \Delta t, W, W' + \Delta W) + \\
 &\quad + \pi'_d V(t + \Delta t, W, W' - \Delta W) \\
 &= V(t + \Delta t, W, W') + \pi_u [V(t + \Delta t, W + \Delta W, W') - V(t + \Delta t, W, W')] - \\
 &\quad - \pi_d [V(t + \Delta t, W, W') - V(t + \Delta t, W - \Delta W, W')] + \\
 &\quad + \pi'_u [V(t + \Delta t, W, W' + \Delta W) - V(t + \Delta t, W, W')] - \\
 &\quad - \pi'_d [V(t + \Delta t, W, W') - V(t + \Delta t, W, W' - \Delta W)]. \quad (13)
 \end{aligned}$$

<sup>9</sup>This is because the two Brownian motions are uncorrelated. If this was not the case, then also jumps to points such as  $(W + \Delta W, W' + \Delta W)$  would have to be considered.

Analogously to (7), the transition probabilities are given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(W, W + \Delta W) &\equiv \pi_u = p + \omega^+ = \frac{\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \left( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \Delta W a^+(t, W, W') \right) \\ \pi(W, W - \Delta W) &\equiv \pi_d = p + \omega^- = \frac{\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \left( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \Delta W a^-(t, W, W') \right) \\ \pi(W', W' + \Delta W) &\equiv \pi'_u = p' + \omega^{+'} = \frac{\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \left( \frac{\sigma^{2'}}{2} + \Delta W a^{+'}(t, W, W') \right) \\ \pi(W', W' - \Delta W) &\equiv \pi'_d = p' + \omega^{-'} = \frac{\Delta t}{(\Delta W)^2} \left( \frac{\sigma^{2'}}{2} + \Delta W a^{-'}(t, W, W') \right) \\ \pi_m &= 1 - \pi_u - \pi_d - \pi'_u - \pi'_d,\end{aligned}$$

where the definition of  $p$  and  $p'$  is as before. Note that  $\pi_m = 1 - p - p'$  in the case when drifts are zero for both agents.

Substitute the  $p$ 's and the  $\omega$ 's into (13). As in (8), terms related to  $p$  and  $p'$  arise from the stochastic parts of the laws of motion and correspond to second-order difference quotients in  $W$  and  $W'$ :

$$\begin{aligned}p[V(\cdot, W + \Delta W, W') + V(\cdot, W - \Delta W, W') - 2V(\cdot, W, W')] + \\ + p'[V(\cdot, W, W' + \Delta W) + V(\cdot, W, W' - \Delta W) - 2V(\cdot, W, W')]\end{aligned}$$

but are not subject to a control variable by the decision maker.

Terms related to the  $\omega$ 's,

$$\begin{aligned}\omega^+[V(\cdot, W + \Delta W, W') - V(\cdot, W, W')] - \omega^-[V(\cdot, W, W') - V(\cdot, W - \Delta W, W')] + \\ \omega^{+'}[V(\cdot, W, W' + \Delta W) - V(\cdot, W, W')] - \omega^{-'}[V(\cdot, W, W') - V(\cdot, W, W' - \Delta W)],\end{aligned}$$

are first-order forward and backward difference quotients in  $W$  and  $W'$  which arise from the drifts  $a(t, W, W')$  and  $a'(t, W, W')$  and *are* subject to the control variables  $(c, g)$  by the decision maker.

Substituting these into the  $\Delta t$ -problem given by (12), ignoring the max-operator, and approximating  $e^{-\rho\Delta t} \approx 1 - \rho\Delta t$  we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}- \left[ \frac{V(t + \Delta t, W, W') - V(t, W, W')}{\Delta t} \right] &\approx -\rho V + u(c) + \alpha u(c') + \\ &+ a^+[V^+] - a^-[V^-] + a^{+'}[V^{+'}] - a^{-'}[V^{-'}] + \\ &+ \frac{\sigma^2}{2}[V^{+-}] + \frac{\sigma^{2'}}{2}[V^{+-'}]\end{aligned}\tag{14}$$

where the arguments of the functions on the right-hand side have been suppressed. The following abbreviations are used:  $[V^+]$  stands for the first-order forward difference quotient in  $W$ ,  $[V^{+'}]$  stands for the first-order forward difference quotient in  $W'$ , analogously  $[V^-]$  and  $[V^{-'}]$ ;

$[V^{+-}]$  and  $[V^{+-}']$  stand for the second-order centered difference quotients in  $W$  and  $W'$ , respectively. We again see that this is a discrete approximation of the HJB for the game.

Shocks to  $y$  can be added in a way entirely analogous to the single-agent case described in section 1.7.

## 2.2 Optimal Consumption and Transfers

Group the terms in which the control variables  $c$  and  $g$  enter into the following function

$$\mathcal{H}(c, g) \equiv u(c) + a^+[V^+] - a^-[V^-] + a^{+'}[V^{+'}] - a^{-'}[V^{-'}].$$

As pointed out in the paper, the other agent's contemporaneous decisions do not influence an agent's choice over  $\Delta t$ . So the optimal value for consumption  $c^*$  can be determined exactly as in the single-agent case (see section 1.5) *only* by looking at the agent's marginal value of saving, which is encoded in  $V^+$  and  $V^-$ . This makes the algorithm simple and fast.

As for transfers, these are set to zero whenever the recipient has non-zero wealth (here:  $W' > 0$ ) according to our guess for equilibrium. When the other player is broke, we compute optimal transfers according to the procedure laid out in sections 3.2 and A.3 in the paper.

## 2.3 Computational issues

We find that reflecting agents back into the grid at the top levels of wealth makes the algorithm more stable than extrapolating the value function (this choice can be made by choosing the variable `Extrap` in our code). When reflecting on the top boundary, we have to make sure that agents are very unlikely (under the ergodic distribution) to reach the regions in the state space where the influence of the boundary is apparent. This can always be ensured by choosing a large-enough grid for  $W$ .

We experimented with non-linear grids, which require slight modifications in the trinomial-grid method. However, it turned out that the algorithm was less stable than with a linear grid. We also tried the Howard-improvement algorithm, but again stability was an issue. The same was true for leaving out policy-updating and using the same policy rules for more than one  $\Delta t$ : There were slight gains in speed, but stability was lost.

Finally, we found that centered differencing worked better than up-wind differencing. The results of the two algorithms were essentially the same, but centered differentiating led to faster convergence.

## 3 Extending the algorithm

We will now demonstrate how to adapt our framework to an overlapping-generations and a finite horizon setting, and how to introduce endogenous risk-taking as well as other choice variables.

### 3.1 Overlapping generations

Our baseline model can be used as a building block for an overlapping-generations economy. Here, the two altruistically-linked agents are a parent household and a child household; together they form a *family*. We will designate *him* as the child household and *her* as the parent household.

An especially simple way to handle the demography is as follows. The parent household faces a mortality hazard given by a Poisson rate  $\delta$ . The child household becomes a parent household upon the death of the current parent household and a new child household is born, resulting in a new family.<sup>10</sup>

When the parent household dies, the remaining wealth is bequeathed to the child household. The new child household's income realization is a random variable that is allowed depend on the old child household's current income. This allows to account for heritability in ability, e.g. a new child household is more likely to enter the economy with a high income realization when its parent household is a high-income earner. We denote  $\pi_{ij}$  to be the probability that the new child household will have initial income realization  $y'_j$ , given that the current child household has income realization  $y'_i$

The parent household's HJB is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \rho v = & \xi[v(\cdot, \tilde{y}) - v(\cdot, y)] + \xi'[v(\cdot, \tilde{y}') - v(\cdot, y')] + \delta(\alpha v^e - v) + \\ & + \alpha u(c') + (rw' + y' - g' - c')v_{w'} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(w^2 v_{ww} + w'^2 v_{w'w'}) \\ & + \max_{c \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + (rw + y + g' - c)v_w \right\} + \max_{g \geq 0} \left\{ g[v_{w'} - v_w] \right\}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $v^e$  is the expected value for the new child household, which will be discussed in more detail later. This HJB is the same as the one presented in the main paper, see equation (8), except that the additional term  $\delta(\alpha v^e - v)$  enters. In the child household's HJB this term shows up as  $\delta(v^e - v')$ . This is because the child household becomes a parent household upon the death of its parent household. The reason this term also shows up in the parent household's HJB is due to altruism. When  $\alpha = 0$ , this term equals  $-\delta v$  so that the child household's welfare is disregarded; when  $\alpha = 1$  the parent household fully internalizes the continuation value of the child household.

As mentioned before,  $v^e$  is the expected value of the child household to become a parent household. The child household has to form an expectation about the income realization of its future child household, and it has to take into account the bequest from the dying parents. Specifically, it is given by

$$v^e(W, y'_i) = \sum_j \pi_{ij} v(W, w'(y'_j), y, y'_i),$$

where  $W = w + w'$ , i.e. the new parent's wealth is the sum of its own savings  $w'$  and the bequest  $w$ . We assume that the new child enters the economy with an initial wealth that is a

<sup>10</sup>Combining the OLG framework here with the time- or age-dependent finite-horizon case in the next subsection, one can model demography more realistically.

function of its initial income realization, i.e. we write  $w'(y'_j)$ .

Computing the equilibrium is similar to the computation of our baseline model. The only difference is that the terms in  $\delta$  are fed in to account for the risk of death/aging; to do this, we have to compute  $v^e$  at each iteration. A good initial guess is given by computing the value functions of a “final” pair of overlapping generations. These are the ones obtained from computing our baseline model with an increased discount rate due to the probability of death.

One specific problem we need to deal with is to obtain the continuation value for very large bequests. When such bequests are made, we often have to obtain  $v^e$  for levels of wealth that lie far outside the grid. An excellent method to extrapolate the function is by exploiting homogeneity. For families with large levels of wealth we can safely neglect the income dimension and thus assume that value functions and policies are homogenous. Consumption and transfer policies are linear in wealth, which translates into value functions being of form  $W^{1-\gamma}$  in total family wealth (for details, see the homogeneous altruism setting in Barczyk & Kredler, 2011a). The old household’s value function is then given by

$$v(w, w', y, y') = \tilde{v}(P)W^{1-\gamma}, \quad \text{where } P = \frac{w}{W}, \quad \text{and } W = w + w'.$$

The function  $\tilde{v}$  can then be calculated from the outermost grid points<sup>11</sup> from

$$\tilde{v}(P) = v(w, w', y, y')W^{\gamma-1}.$$

This gives us  $\tilde{v}(P)$  on a finite grid; intermediate values can be approximated by linear interpolation. The  $P$  which realizes upon death of the parent household is given by

$$P = \frac{w + w'}{w'(y'_j) + w + w'}.$$

### 3.2 Finite horizon

We will now show how to compute our baseline model for the case where the horizon is finite, i.e.  $t \in [0, T]$ ; the code for this example can be found in `AltruismUncert_FinHorizon.m` in the folder `Altruism`.

When the horizon is finite, value functions depend on time. Her HJB is

$$-v_t = -\rho v + u(c^*) + \alpha u(c'^*) + \dot{w}v_w + \dot{w}'v_{w'} + \xi[v(\cdot, \tilde{y}) - v(\cdot, y)] + \xi[v(\cdot, \tilde{y}') - v(\cdot, y')] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(w^2v_{ww}w'^2v_{w'w'})$$

A tricky feature of computing a finite-horizon equilibrium here (and in many other continuous-time models) is how to proceed close to  $T$ . In our model, as in any consumption-savings model, consumption rates go to infinity when  $t \rightarrow T$ . This makes it hard to compute value functions. To deal with this problem, we make an assumption on what happens during the last  $\Delta t$ -stage of the game. We assume that agents’ income is not subject to risk any more, and that agents

<sup>11</sup>i.e. the grid points where either the parent or the child household hold (or both) hold the maximal wealth  $\bar{W}$  on the grid.

together consume the resources left to them at a constant rate. So we have

$$c_{T-\Delta t}\Delta t + c'_{T-\Delta t}\Delta t = \underbrace{w_{T-\Delta t} + w'_{T-\Delta t} + y_{T-\Delta t}\Delta t + y'_{T-\Delta t}\Delta t}_{=W_{T-\Delta t}}.$$

When one agent owns all resources, we assume that she obtains her preferred allocation over  $\Delta t$ . So she consumes a fraction  $A = 1/(1 + \alpha^{1/\gamma})$  of  $W_{T-\Delta t}$  when she owns all resources, and he obtains his preferred fraction  $A' = 1/(1 + \alpha'^{1/\gamma})$  of  $W_{T-\Delta t}$  when he owns everything. In all situations in between, we linearly interpolate between these two extreme allocations using the fraction  $P_{T-\Delta t} = (w_{T-\Delta t} + y_{T-\Delta t}\Delta t)/W_{T-\Delta t}$  she owns out of total resources:

$$\begin{aligned} c_{T-\Delta t} &= [(1 - P_{T-\Delta t})A + P_{T-\Delta t}A']W_{T-\Delta t}, \\ c'_{T-\Delta t} &= [(1 - P_{T-\Delta t})A' + P_{T-\Delta t}A]W_{T-\Delta t}. \end{aligned}$$

Using these consumption levels we compute the value functions as  $v_{T-\Delta t} = [u(c_{T-\Delta t}) + \alpha u(c'_{T-\Delta t})]\Delta t$  and  $v'_{T-\Delta t} = [u(c'_{T-\Delta t}) + \alpha' u(c_{T-\Delta t})]\Delta t$ .

Other assumptions for the final  $\Delta t$ -period are possible. We found that it is crucial, however, that value functions are increasing in the agent's own asset share (i.e.  $v$  must be increasing in  $P_{T-\Delta t}$ , for example). Specifically, one very natural assumption for the final  $\Delta t$ -period leads to problems: If we let the agents play a static altruism game at  $T - \Delta t$  (i.e. agents give transfers at  $T - \Delta t$  and then consume what they have left), numerical instability arises: Consumption functions become locally decreasing in agents' own assets. The problem is that the value functions at  $T - \Delta t$  have strong convexities at the points where transfers start to flow.

Given value functions at  $T - \Delta t$ , we can backward-iterate on the HJBs as in the baseline case, only that this time we keep the results on the way. It is very important to make adjustments to the time increments of the algorithm in order to fulfill the stability conditions. Since consumption rates are very high close to  $T - \Delta t$ , the time increment required to keep the Markov chain's transition probabilities positive is very small.

Computationally, we find that – as expected – policies and value functions smoothly converge to their time-invariant counterparts. Transfer motives in the problematic region (between the over-consumption region and the SS region) are lowest close to  $T$  and then rise as we go back in time. So the equilibrium is even more stable in the finite-horizon than the infinite-horizon case. This is in the sense that equilibrium exists for a larger range of  $\sigma$  when fixing a  $(\alpha, \alpha', \gamma)$ -combination.

### 3.3 Endogenous risk-taking

We will now consider the situation where players have access to two assets: A safe asset with rate of return  $r$ , and a risky asset with expected rate of return  $r$  and standard deviation  $\sigma$ . We will later discuss how to adjust the parameters in the program `AltruismUncert_main.m` for endogenous risk-taking.

In this extended setting, additional to the consumption and transfer functions players now

have to choose the portfolio share in the risky asset. The portfolio shares in the risky assets are functions  $z(x_t) \in [0, 1]$ ,  $z'(x_t) \in [0, 1]$ , i.e. we assume that there is no short-selling. The resulting laws of motion for wealth are

$$\begin{aligned} dw_t &= (rw_t + y_t - c_t - g_t + g'_t)dt + z_t w_t \sigma dB_t \\ dw'_t &= (rw'_t + y'_t - c'_t - g'_t + g_t)dt + z'_t w'_t \sigma dB'_t \end{aligned}$$

Her HJB is then

$$\begin{aligned} \rho v &= \xi[v(\cdot, \tilde{y}) - v(\cdot, y)] + \xi'[v(\cdot, \tilde{y}') - v(\cdot, y')] + \alpha u(c') + (rw' + y' - g' - c')v_{w'} + z'^2 w'^2 \frac{\sigma^2}{2} v_{w'w'} + \\ &+ \max_{c \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + (rw + y + g' - c)v_w \right\} + \max_{g \geq 0} \left\{ g[v_{w'} - v_w] \right\} + \max_{z \in [0,1]} \underbrace{\left\{ z^2 w^2 \frac{\sigma^2}{2} v_{ww} \right\}}_{\text{risk-taking}}, \end{aligned}$$

where the portfolio decisions show up in the terms in second derivatives of the value function. The risk-taking decision can be decoupled from the consumption and transfer decision and is given by the following bang-bang-type rule:

$$z^* = I(v_{ww} > 0),$$

where  $I(\cdot)$  is the indicator function. So she goes fully into the risky asset whenever the value function is convex, if not she invests only in the safe asset. It is now straightforward to adapt the Markov-chain method: We determine the optimal risk-taking decision from the finite approximation of the second derivative and then set the variance of the chain to  $z^{*2} k^2 \sigma^2 / 2$ . The rest is as before.

To implement this in the code `AltruismUncert_main.m`, the risk parameters have to be set to `SigmaNorm=0` and `SigmaRisky=σ`. It turns out that the following adjustments make the code more stable.

First, instead of using the discontinuous indicator function  $I(\cdot)$  directly, we approximate it by a logistic smoother. This makes the law of motion continuous in the state, which adds stability. We take  $h(x) = 1/(1 + e^{-\kappa x})$  and apply it to the first derivative of the optimal consumption function  $c^*$  with respect to the player's own assets, i.e. we set  $z^* = h(c_w^*)$ .  $c_k^*$  is a sign-preserving transformation of  $v_{ww}$ , but unlike  $v_{ww}$  it is roughly of the same magnitude across the grid. For the smoothing coefficient  $\kappa$ , we choose values around 10. The risk-taking decision is coded in the function `AltruismRiskTaking.m`.

Second, we only allow the poorer agent to take risks in the algorithm – this is what happens in equilibrium in the end anyway. If we allow both agents to take risk along the way to convergence, it can happen that agents engage in local “risk-taking battles” that destabilize the algorithm.

### 3.4 Adding more choice variables

Adding more choice variables should generally not present large difficulties in our setting. The example with the portfolio decision in the previous subsection is one example. We present here the Bellman equation for a setting where she makes a continuous labor-supply decision. The wage rate is fixed at  $z$ . We assume that his income is still exogenous.

$$v = \max_{c,l} \{u(c,l) + (rw + zl - c)v_w\} + \dots,$$

where we omit the rest of the terms because they are the same as before. The first-order condition for labor is

$$u_l(c,l) + zv_w = 0.$$

If utility is separable in consumption and labor, the computation of labor supply is especially simple. Even in the non-separable case, the adaptation of the Markov-chain method is straightforward: Once the optimal  $(c, l)$ -pair is found for the  $\Delta t$ -stage game, value-function updating works the same as before.