

## Special Interest Politics

Spring 2018

Prof. Alvaro Name

### *Course Description*

**Objective.** This module focuses on optimal committee design when members are subject to either external influence or internal norms of behavior. We examine situations in which different instruments of persuasion are used by outsiders, such as, monetary resources, social pressure, coercion, and provision of information.

**Grading.** A final exam (60%) and assignments (40%).

### Schedule

#### Introduction-Influencing a Policy-Maker

- [\*]Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. "Special Interest Politics". MIT press, 2001. Chapters 7 and 8.
- Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Rafael Di Tella. "Capture by threat." *Journal of Political Economy* 111.5 (2003): 1123-1154.

#### Committee Capture

- [\*]Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. "Special Interest Politics". MIT press, 2001. Chapter 9.
- [\*]Dal Bo, Ernesto. "Bribing voters." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4) (2007): 789-803.
- [\*]Name-Correa Alvaro and Huseyin Yildirim. "A Capture Theory of Committees." (2016).
- Dekel, Eddie, Matthew O. Jackson, and Asher Wolinsky. "Vote buying: General elections." *Journal of Political Economy* 116.2 (2008): 351-380.
- Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder. "Buying supermajorities." *American Political Science Review* 90(2) (1996): 303-315.

### **Persuasion through Provision of Information**

- [\*]Caillaud, Bernard, and Jean Tirole. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group." *The American Economic Review* 97.5 (2007): 1877-1900.
- [\*]Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann. "Lobbying legislatures." *Journal of Political Economy* 110.4 (2002): 919-946.
- [\*]Alonso, Ricardo and Odilon Câmara. 2016. "Persuading Voters." *The American Economic Review*, 106(11): 3590-3605.
- Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann. "Informational lobbying and political contributions." *Journal of Public Economics* 90.4 (2006): 631-656.
- Kamenica, Emir, and Matthew Gentzkow. "Bayesian persuasion." *The American Economic Review* 101.6 (2011): 2590-2615.

### **Committees with Mixed Motives**

- [\*]Name-Correa Alvaro and Huseyin Yildirim. "Social Pressure, Transparency, and Voting in Committees", working paper.
- Morgan, John, and Felix Várdy. "Mixed motives and the optimal size of voting bodies." *Journal of Political Economy* 120.5 (2012): 986-1026.
- Midjord, Rune, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, and Justin Valasek. "Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art model.'" *Games and Economic Behavior* 104 (2017): 430-443.

### **Buying Bargaining Power**

- [\*]Yildirim, Huseyin. "Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition." *Journal of Economic Theory* 136.1 (2007): 167-196.
- Ali, S. Nageeb. "Recognition for sale." *Journal of Economic Theory* 155 (2015): 16-29.