The Political Economy of the Maoist Conflict in India: An Empirical Analysis

Author: Joseph Flavian Gomes

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

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- **What causes Civil Conflicts?**
- Huge literature: Relation between economic performance and civil conflicts?
- Most of the literature uses a cross country approach with aggregate data. Collier & Hoeffler (2004), Fearon & Laitin (2003) Miguel et al. (2004)
  - Data might not be comparable across countries.
  - Reasons for the conflict might vary from country to country .
  - Conflicts are often localized.
  - Cannot control for all the factors that are constant within the country.
  - Ignore the within country heterogeneity like unequal spatial distribution of resources withing the country.
- Going sub-national is important. (Dube & Vargas, 2006 Iyer & Do, 2009, Jha 2008.)

- Going to micro data is also crucial:
  - Individual & group level conflict factors such as poverty and ethnic hostility are imperfectly tested at the national level (B&M (2010),Sambanis (2004)).
  - Conflicts often deal with unequal spatial distribution of resources between individuals.
  - Horizontal inequality matters? Intersection between ethnicity and income?
- This paper will study the Naxalite conflict in India using district level micro data.

- The other critical issue: establishing causality.
  1. There might exist unmeasured factors that affect both conflict intensity and pre conflict characteristics. (I&D)
  2. Districts that are experiencing more violence might also be districts that have experienced high past conflict. (I&D)
- Miguel et al. (2004), Dube & Vargas (2006) use IV approach
- This paper:
  1. Use data from pre conflict period, (Iyer & Do, 2009; Mitra & Ray, 2010)
  2. Control for all possible variables subject to the data availability.
  3. Always control for past conflict levels.
  4. Also IV regressions where possible with previous period income as IV for present income.

- The other important contribution: traces the origins of civil conflict to a new channel : **Historical Institutions**.
- Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002); La Porta et al. (1998,1999,2000); Engerman & Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2002)), Jha (2008)
- Banerjee & Iyer, AER' 2005:
  - Colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India, lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes.
  - The conflictual environment this created is likely to have limited the possibility of collective action in these areas.
  - Differences in the political environment: greater emphasis on land reform measures, less on development expenditure.

- Adds to a small literature of sub-national micro studies of civil conflict: a clear progress over existing cross country literature.
- Some progress on Causality.
- Exploiting the micro characteristics of the data allows some interesting questions.
  - Explore the Exclusion hypothesis.
- First paper to analyze rigorously the Naxalite conflict in India which is a very serious problem.
- India is a really interesting case : fast growing economy whose success determines the fate of 1/3 of the world's poor.
- Add to the literature on Institutions.

- Peasant uprising in 1967 in Naxalbari, a small village in WB.
- After WB the movement spread to AP where the formation of the PWG (1980) marks the revival of the movement post Naxalbari.
- It has since then spread across various states in India across many districts.
- 2004 merger of the PWG & MCC $\Rightarrow$ (CPI-Maoist) that marks the modern revival.
- A terrifying increase in proportions thereafter.


LEFT-WING EXTREMIST AFFECTED AREAS IN INDIA
Institute for Conflict Management
South Asia Terrorism Portal
Uttarakhand
Pakistan
Bihar
Haryana
Uttar Pradesh
Nepal
Rajasthan
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
West Bengal
Maharashtra
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Chhattisgarh
Highly Affected (58)
Orissa
Moderately Affected (54)
Andhra Pradesh
Marginally Affected (83)
(Total affected Districts - 195,
Affected States - 16)
Tamilnadu
Kerala
Sri Lanka
April 2009

KEY FACTS:

Districts in India	602
Districts affected by Maoist violence	165
Insurgency related deaths in 2005	892 (Ministry of Home Affairs)
Insurgency related deaths in 2006	749 (Asian Centre for Human Rights estimate)
Violent incidents related to the insurgency in 2005	1,594 (Ministry of Home Affairs).
Displaced people in Chhattisgarh state, end 2006	43,740 (Asian Centre for Human Rights, early 2007)

Source: Thomson reuters:

- Naxalite violence during the years 2006-2010 (upto November 30, 2010)

Parameter	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
No. of incidents:	1509	1565	1591	2258	1995
Civilians Killed :	521	460	660	799	937
No. of Security forces Killed :	157	236	231	317	277
No. of naxalites killed :	274	141	199	217	161

- State-wise extent of naxal violence during 2006 to 2010 (upto 30 November, 2010)

State	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths
AndhraPradesh	183	47	138	45	92	46	66	18	87	21
Bihar	107	45	135	67	164	73	232	72	286	91
Chhattisgarh	715	388	582	369	620	242	529	290	552	323
Jharkhand	310	124	482	157	484	207	742	208	448	142
M.P.	23	17	32	6	35	26	1	-	7	1
Maharashtra	98	42	94	25	68	22	154	93	78	39
Orissa	44	9	67	17	103	101	266	67	194	73
U.P.	11	5	9	3	4	-	8	2	6	1
West Bengal	23	17	32	6	35	26	255	158	333	237
Other States	12	-	17	5	14	4	5	-	4	-
Total	**1509**	**678**	**1565**	**696**	**1591**	**721**	**2258**	**908**	**1995**	**928**

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

- Bhatia (2005) studies Central Bihar.
  1. Economic rights
     - land rights
     - minimum wages
     - common property resources
     - housing
  2. Social rights
  3. Political rights
- Government of India:
  - Land related factors,
  - Displacement & Forced evictions,
  - Livelihood,
  - Social Oppression,
  - (non- socio economic reasons:bad governance & policing).

- Land rights:
  - *Fight for land rights, march towards democracy in the country* Liberation slogan
  - In practice land redistribution is one of the main goals of the movement.
  - Focus is on trying to provide land, from landlords/government land, to the landless.
  - Failed peace talks between the AP govt. & PWG in 2004.
- Underdevelopment also one of the key reasons:
  - 3/4 of Dantewada's 1,220 villages are almost wholly tribal; 1,161 have no medical facilities; 214 have no primary school; the literacy rate is 29% for men and 14% for women (The Economist)
- Participation:
  - Landless, small peasants with marginal landholdings, & to a lesser extent middle peasants.
  - In caste terms, lower and intermediate castes.

- Hypothesis 1: **Land inequality increases conflict.**
- In a predominantly agrarian economy, the importance of land cannot be overemphasized.
- Andre & Platteau (1998), Verwimp (2003): Rwandan genocide.
  - Land distribution had become increasingly unequal and land dispossession rampant.
  - Perpetrators: mostly poor wage workers and land renters; Victims: primarily from the landlord class.
- High land inequality reflects high disparities in the social & economic lives of the people $\Rightarrow$ higher potential for grievance.
- Land inequality $\Rightarrow$ Compensation inequality.
- Tribal people in remote places do not have any formal title deeds.
- Besley & Burgess 2000: land reforms reduces poverty.
- 3 extreme districts in WB: West Midnapur, Puruliya, Bankura: land reforms haven't taken place too well.(Chakaravorty)

- Hypothesis 2: **Underdevelopment leads to more conflict.**
- Theoretical idea: Becker (1968) - rise in returns to crime induces more workers to the criminal sector.
- Relation between income and conflict is one of the most robust relations.
- Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2004); Fearon & Laitin (2003), Miguel et al., Do & Iyer, Iyer, Dubey & Vargas
  - Opportunity Cost.
  - Grievance.
  - Poor state capacity.
  - Rapacity/Greed.

Land Inequality by Maoist Presence:

Round = 1



Round = 2



Round =3



(Blue line Maoist = 1, Red line Maoist = 0)

Log_MPC by Maoist Presence:

Round 1



Round 2



Round_3



(Blue line Maoist = 1, Red line Maoist = 0)

- Hypothesis 3: **Historical land institutions impact the conflict.**
  - Via Underdevelopment
  - Via Land Inequality
  - Via Socio-political environment.
- Allocation of the revenue collecting rights to landlords (de facto property right over the land) $\Rightarrow$ perpetual conflict between the peasants and landlords.
- Land acquisition by govt. is an important issue pursued by the Maoists.
- Given adequate compensation less discontent with the displacement.
- Duflo & Pande: landlord districts do worse than the nonlandlord districts for dams.
- The social relation in the landlord districts renders collective action difficult & leads to inadequate compensation.

Proportion Landlord by Maoist Presence:

Round 1



Round 2



Round 3



(Blue line Maoist = 1, Red line Maoist = 0)

The Landlord & the Non Landlord districts:



Source: Banerjee & Iyer' AER 2005

- Hypothesis 4: **The presence of disadvantaged castes leads to more conflict.**
- The main support for the Naxalite movement comes from dalits and adivasis (GOI)
- Grievances arising out of feelings of exclusion?
- 'Horizontal' inequality i.e. inequality that coincides with ethnic cleavages is a particular important driver of civil conflict. (Sambanis 2005, Stewart 2001, B&M 2010)

- Districts are the smallest administrative units in India for which reliable data is available.
- Naxalite/Maoist incidents:
  - Global Terrorism Database (GTD) I: 1970-1997 & II: 1998-2004: Consolidated GTD, data till 2007.
  - Rand-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998 onwards)
  - Worlwide Incidents tracking system (WITS), National Counter Terrorism Centre (2004-2007)
  - South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP): Detailed acounts of all major Naxalite incidents (2005 onwards).
- Consumption/Income:
  - National Sample Survey(NSS):Consumption expenditure survey every 5 years
  - 1987-88 (43rd), (1993-94 (50th) not useable), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st).
  - Mean per capita consumption (MPC), using 30 day recall period: a proxy for per capita income.
  - Also, Gini coefficients of inequality within the districts

- Demography:
  - Census 2001: total population, Schedule tribe and Caste population
- Geography:
  - Wasteland atlas of India, Department of Land Resources (Ministry of Rural development)
  - State of forest cover reports of the Forest Survey of India (FSI)
- Land distribution:
  - Agricultural census of India, 1991: number of operated landholdings in the different size classes: Small, semi-medium, medium and, large.
  - Gini coefficient for land inequality is calculated.
- Colonial Land Institutions:
  - Banerjee & Iyer AER 2005
  - Land Institutions for only 233 districts: which were directly under British control.

- Two variables of interest
  - **Probability of Conflict**: 0-1 binary outcome variable : presence of conflict- Probit.
  - **Intensity of Conflict**: Count variable *Total number of incidents* or *Total number of dead & wounded* -NBREG.
- Econometric specification is very simple:
  $(Conflict)_{j,t} = \alpha_t (Conflict)_{j,t-1} + \beta_j X_{j,t} + \gamma_j G_j + \alpha_s + t + \epsilon_{j,t}$
- Always use cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the state level.
- Other controls:
  - Geographical factors: forests, sloping land, sandy land, barren rocky land etc.
  - income inequality and size variables like population density, area etc.

- A lower MPC significantly increases the risk of conflict (not robust)
- IV Probit regressions: Significant & Robust.
  - AME: 1 SD increase in the logMPC increases the probability of conflict by 13 %
  - 4 more incidents & 28 more dead and wounded.
- Land inequality is a highly significant and robust predictor of conflict:
  - AME: 1 SD increase $\Rightarrow$ increases probability of conflict by 9 %
  - 5 more incidents and 35 more dead & wounded people.

Table: Dep Var: Maoist

	(1) probit1	(2) probit2	(3) probit3	(4) probit4	(5) probit5	(6) probit6
maoist_1	1.912***	1.875***	2.111***	1.453***	0.928***	0.626***
prop_sandy	-2.497	1.074	5.001	23.67***	24.40**	31.53**
log_stcapdistance	-0.0847	-0.0841	0.0488	0.247	-0.0181	0.192
prop_barrenrocky	7.877***	12.37***	17.32***	34.39***	19.24***	33.93***
prop_steepsloping	-68.93***	-59.95***	-81.18**	-61.78**	-132.7***	-106.9***
proportion forest cover	1.145**	1.100	1.863**	1.572**	1.961***	2.040***
log_area	0.558**	0.671***	0.724***	0.902***	0.732***	0.759***
consumption pc	-1.621***	-1.413***	-1.805***	-0.828	-1.097	-0.588
land inequality	3.337***	3.434***	3.441***	2.992***	4.374***	5.324***
%Scheduled Castes		-0.531	0.116	-0.953	2.282	3.958**
%Scheduled Tribes		0.849*	1.106*	0.269	1.457***	1.256**
population density		-59.74	-150.6**	-113.9***	19.63	2.098
income inequality		-0.178	-3.348*	-5.958***	1.166	-1.320
initial consumption pc			-0.263	0.387		
Prop. Non landlord				-1.392***		-1.256**
State Dummies					Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	996	996	656	431	767	548

Table: Dep Var: Maoist

	(1) ivprobit1	(2) ivprobit2	(3) ivprobit3	(4) ivprobit4	(5) ivprobit5	(6) ivprobit6
consumption pc	-3.078***	-2.808***	-3.427***	-3.215**	-3.551***	-3.536*
maoist_1	1.954***	2.007***	1.919***	1.308***	0.954***	0.639**
prop_sandy	-0.907	5.844	5.729	26.31***	35.48	43.08*
log_stcapdistance	-0.0245	0.00487	0.0325	0.192	0.0776	0.226
prop_barrenrocky	10.43***	17.33***	18.22***	32.26***	25.49***	34.56***
prop_steepsloping	-56.51**	-45.69*	-75.42**	-56.67*	-82.55**	-49.45
proportion forest cover	1.278*	1.866**	1.818**	1.529*	2.758***	3.018***
log_area	0.338	0.575**	0.553**	0.661**	0.708***	0.723***
land inequality	3.610***	3.215***	3.039**	2.363**	3.530***	3.884***
%Scheduled Castes		-0.118	-0.353	-1.095	2.030	3.950**
%Scheduled Tribes		0.657	0.548	-0.841	0.955*	-0.505
population density		-132.3**	-135.1**	-90.23***	-72.44	-79.00
income inequality		-1.333	-0.190	-0.763	3.478	1.564
initial consumption pc			0.716	1.338		
Prop. Non landlord				-0.953**		-1.314***
State Dummies					Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	640	640	638	420	520	359

Table: Dep Var: No. of Incidents

	(1) nbreg1	(2) nbreg2	(3) nbreg3	(4) nbreg4	(5) nbreg5	(6) nbreg6
maoist_1	2.891***	2.731***	2.935***	2.165***	1.201***	0.888**
prop_sandy	-17.30	-12.67	-13.25	1.164	8.291	18.12
log_stcapdistance	-0.287*	-0.302	-0.0125	0.159	-0.104	0.0306
prop_barrenrocky	19.24**	30.17***	36.71***	39.24***	21.59***	27.99***
prop_steepsloping	-112.9***	-101.3**	-135.1***	-152.3**	-136.2**	-124.1*
proportion forest cover	2.385**	2.200*	2.767**	2.991**	2.960***	3.762***
log_area	1.570***	1.865***	1.891***	2.434***	1.536***	1.955***
consumption pc	-2.887***	-2.004**	-1.744*	-1.376	-1.718**	-1.637
land inequality	7.590***	8.066***	7.977***	6.160***	6.499***	6.511***
%Scheduled Castes		-0.867	-0.0752	-1.311	2.821	5.415*
%Scheduled Tribes		2.198***	2.302***	-0.579	2.358***	1.188
population density		-107.7***	-137.6***	-132.0**	85.04	50.03
income inequality		-3.240	-9.450**	-14.12***	0.246	-1.734
initial consumption pc			-0.931	0.0657		
Prop. Non landlord				-1.279***		-1.183**
State Dummies					Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	996	996	656	431	996	655

Table: Dep Var: No. of dead wounded

	(1) nbreg1	(2) nbreg2	(3) nbreg3	(4) nbreg4	(5) nbreg5	(6) nbreg6
maoist_1	2.925***	2.755***	2.941***	2.298***	0.943**	0.639
prop_sandy	-50.69***	-39.58**	-48.38***	-40.40***	11.45	36.52
log_stcapdistance	-0.497***	-0.636***	-0.151	-0.127	-0.251	-0.189
prop_barrenrocky	21.44***	30.25***	40.17***	40.48***	34.47***	42.84***
prop_steepsloping	-191.3***	-187.0***	-234.0***	-255.9***	-306.5***	-323.7***
proportion forest cover	4.119***	3.691**	4.248**	5.890***	4.949***	6.060***
log_area	1.940***	2.409***	2.317***	3.038***	2.144***	2.691***
consumption pc	-4.398***	-2.845**	-1.674	-1.499	-3.329*	-2.612
land inequality	11.44***	12.34***	11.14***	8.581***	13.13***	14.11***
%Scheduled Castes		-3.005	-3.845	-5.684	5.467	9.513***
%Scheduled Tribes		2.819**	1.972*	-3.349***	2.764	1.037
population density		-88.03**	-119.2***	-128.2	149.5	124.7
income inequality		-5.387	-14.42***	-21.21***	-1.728	-5.001
initial consumption pc			-2.611**	-1.829		
Prop. Non landlord				-1.186***		-1.335*
State Dummies					Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	996	996	656	431	996	655

- Exclusion story: not too robust results
  - Interestingly in the specifications where both the variables are significant, the SCST consumption has a higher magnitude.
  - Moreover, SC/ST income has a negatively significant and robust impact on the number of incidents in a particular district.
  - Districts where the SCs & STs have a lower income experience significantly more Maoist incidents than other districts.
  - The same results does not hold for the incomes of the general castes.
  - Similar for dead & wounded
  - AME: 1 SD increase in the log(MPC) of the SC/STs $\Rightarrow$ around 4-6 more Maoist incidents
  - 1 SD increase in the log(MPC) of the General Castes $\Rightarrow$ around 1-3 more incidents.

Table: Dep Var: No. of Incidents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
maoist_1	2.869***	2.777***	3.034***	2.301***	1.228***
prop_sandy	-16.40	-11.72	-12.20	4.016	8.007
log_stcapdistance	-0.305*	-0.244	0.0183	0.141	-0.104
prop_barrenrocky	20.33***	31.37***	36.70***	34.73***	21.40***
prop_steepsloping	-119.1***	-97.48***	-129.9***	-147.1***	-133.1**
proportion forest cover	2.594**	2.511**	2.743**	2.559*	2.847***
log_area	1.589***	1.778***	1.841***	2.486***	1.558***
log_gen_mpc	-1.201***	-0.932	-0.683	-0.306	-0.700***
log_scst_mpc	-2.079***	-1.710***	-1.669***	-2.161***	-1.161*
land inequality	7.425***	7.703***	7.502***	5.505**	6.465***
%Scheduled Castes & Tribes		2.611***	3.297***	-0.852	2.614***
population density		-107.2***	-142.2***	-132.2**	75.03
income inequality		-3.356	-9.596***	-13.84***	-0.549
General_MPC			-1.733***	-1.312	
SCST_MPC			0.956	1.725	
Prop. Non landlord				-1.140***	
State Dummies					Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	993	993	651	426	993

- Historical Land Institutions: significant & robust results.
  - We note that the proportion of the district i.e. not landlord is robust to the various specifications and has significant effect.
  - Land inequality and the geography variables still continue to be significant in explaining presence of conflict.
  - AME: 1 SD increase in the proportion of the district that was not controlled by the landlords
    - Reduces the probability of Maoist conflict in this district by around 8%
    - Results in 2 less incidents
    - And around 10-12 less dead & wounded people.
- The relation between Growth and conflict not robust.

Table: Dep Var: Maoist

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
maoist_1	1.904***	1.707***	1.504***	1.503***	1.357***	1.364***	0.611***
Prop. Non landlord	-1.047***	-1.266***	-1.526***	-1.268***	-1.436***	-1.234***	-1.230**
prop_sandy		16.62***	18.69***	19.84***	20.33***	20.42***	31.42**
log_stcapdistance		0.0838	0.151	0.164	0.188	0.192	0.193
prop_barrenrocky		9.442**	25.87***	24.55***	28.18***	27.63***	33.81***
prop_steepsloping		-57.69*	-27.05	-22.45	-39.45	-33.89	-107.7***
proportion forest cover		0.784	1.559**	1.674**	1.260**	1.296*	2.091***
log_area		0.336	0.587***	0.579***	0.761***	0.725***	0.734***
population density			-120.6***	-125.4***	-85.26***	-78.17***	4.929
%Scheduled Castes			-1.269	-1.069	-1.498	-1.394	3.966**
%Scheduled Tribes			-0.302	-0.901	0.765	0.211	1.229**
consumption pc				-1.087***		-0.948**	-0.724
land inequality					3.014***	2.973***	5.391***
State Dummies							Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	698	668	668	655	668	655	548

Table: Dep Var: No. of incidents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
maoist_1	3.378***	2.307***	1.991***	2.150***	1.805***	1.904***	0.864**
Prop. Non landlord	-1.089*	-1.986***	-2.186***	-1.589***	-1.883***	-1.381***	-1.145**
prop_sandy		-0.110	2.987	7.379	6.717	8.738	18.12
log_stcapdistance		-0.251	-0.104	-0.0130	-0.0156	0.0753	0.0388
prop_barrenrocky		13.46	32.29***	24.36***	45.14***	39.17***	28.30***
prop_steepsloping		-77.67*	-51.75	-45.80	-69.91	-62.04	-126.9*
proportion forest cover		0.507	2.533**	2.759**	2.277*	2.257*	3.788***
log_area		1.487***	1.831***	1.817***	2.171***	2.073***	1.906***
population density			-186.3***	-192.7***	-143.1***	-113.3***	52.93
%Scheduled Castes			-0.868	-1.097	-0.906	-1.061	5.609*
%Scheduled Tribes			-0.646	-2.461***	1.200	-0.489	1.175
consumption pc				-2.365***		-2.218***	-1.842
land inequality					6.593***	6.632***	6.681***
State Dummies							Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	698	668	668	655	668	655	655

Table: Dep Var: Maoist (Growth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
maoist_1	2.375***	2.109***	2.161***	1.468***	1.069***
prop_sandy	-1.552	3.260	3.244	25.81***	43.60
log_stcapdistance	-0.0501	0.000879	0.00972	0.200	0.150
prop_barrenrocky	3.563	15.00***	17.17***	34.31***	27.98***
prop_steepsloping	-54.89***	-71.01***	-89.14***	-69.43*	-110.3***
proportion forest cover	0.958	0.779	1.483*	1.687**	2.119**
log_area	0.0728	0.581*	0.542*	0.745**	0.942***
mpc_growth	-0.0361***	-0.0509***	-0.0582***	-0.0344	-0.00706
%Scheduled Castes		0.399	0.350	-1.227	2.205
%Scheduled Tribes		2.355***	1.599**	0.975	2.174***
population density		-82.71	-83.13	-103.0***	-6.836
gini_growth		-0.00143	-0.00375	-0.0159	-0.0226*
land inequality		3.984***	3.776***	3.207***	4.158***
initial consumption pc			-1.612**	-0.172	
Prop. Non landlord				-1.539***	
State Dummies					Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	640	639	637	419	500

Table: Dep Var: Maoist (Growth by subgroups)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
maoist_1	2.441***	2.187***	2.319***	1.584***	1.110***	0.732***
prop_sandy	-1.552	2.655	4.493	24.91***	43.48**	47.46**
log_stcapdistance	-0.0524	0.0323	0.0445	0.262	0.149	0.242
prop_barrenrocky	3.282	13.64**	15.28***	32.78***	27.69***	37.51***
prop_steepsloping	-58.38***	-68.27***	-84.31**	-61.28*	-112.0***	-84.32*
proportion forest cover	1.098*	1.014	1.710**	1.949**	2.173***	2.368***
log_area	0.0821	0.517	0.521	0.691**	0.935***	0.827***
General_MPC_growth	-0.00709**	-0.00884*	-0.0168*	-0.0128	-0.00247	-0.00749
SCST_MPC_growth	-0.0275**	-0.0314**	-0.0294**	-0.0229	-0.00616	-0.00923
%Scheduled Castes & Tribes		2.208***	2.089***	0.250	2.129***	2.347***
population density		-67.85	-110.7	-95.94***	-4.027	-15.14
gini_growth		-0.0123	-0.0276***	-0.0305***	-0.0233*	-0.0185
land inequality		3.653***	3.086**	2.668***	4.240***	5.059***
General_MPC			-1.935***	-0.176		
SCST_MPC			-0.00814	-0.309		
Prop. Non landlord				-1.574***		-1.504***
State Dummies					Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	636	636	633	415	497	355

- Contributes to a small but growing literature that uses micro data.
- The very first attempt to rigorously study the Maoist conflict in India.
- Some very interesting insights on the causes:
  - Lower income leads to more conflict (in line with the existing literature)
  - Barren rocky variable further support to the grievance & opportunity cost story.
  - Attention needs to be paid to Land issues & Compensation
- Historical Institutions could affect present day conflict outcomes.
  - Landlord districts might have had more land reforms, the class based antagonism and embittered social relations continue.
- Exclusion? Not really.

- Control for land reforms.
- Find adequate instruments for the income variables to further ensure that our results are not affected by endogeneity.
- A lot of work remains to be done in terms of data collection from the households of the perpetrators and victims in order to further pin down both the causes and consequences of the Maoist conflict at the household/individual level.

	Districts Affected	
Round 1	Conflict t-1	Conflict t+1
Not Affected	358	338
Affected	3	23
Round 2		
Not Affected	339	293
Affected	23	69
Round 3		
Not Affected	293	269
Affected	69	93

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
maoist	1085	0.170507	0.376251	0	1
deadwounded	1085	6.322581	59.3128	0	1837
nincidents	1085	2.41106	15.79039	0	428
maoist_1	1085	0.087558	0.282781	0	1
gini	1046	0.266298	0.060809	0.103525	0.525915
mpc_87	1030	5.052897	0.244983	4.410083	5.777959
General_MPC_87	1030	5.132978	0.249794	4.498148	6.014436
SCST_MPC_87	1028	4.870675	0.250028	4.180412	5.941787
SC_percent	1082	0.181887	0.084322	0.004932	0.531364
ST_percent	1082	0.110195	0.1789	0	0.93761
landineq91	1055	0.47359	0.178855	0.120449	0.788384
p_forest	1082	0.167094	0.18037	0.000699	0.832942
$pop_density$	1082	0.006383	0.022805	0.000692	0.416596
log_mpc	1046	5.849775	0.628196	4.410083	7.352093
log_gen_mpc	1043	6.002583	0.696857	4.498148	8.501844
log_scst_mpc	1045	5.674889	0.628981	4.180412	7.374076
log_area	1082	8.721257	0.696394	6.475433	10.7288
prop_sandy	1040	0.006336	0.040049	0	0.688315
prop_barrenrocky	1040	0.00799	0.020191	0	0.265584
prop_steepsloping	1040	0.002556	0.010052	0	0.129534
log_stcapdistance	1031	5.485296	0.811263	0	6.899219
SCST_percent	1082	0.292082	0.15533	0.016113	0.946497
log_mpc_lag	686	5.608404	0.620172	4.410083	6.848523
log_gen_mpc_lag	685	5.727645	0.666179	4.498148	7.336274
log_scst_mpc_lag	685	5.440889	0.634257	4.180412	7.374076
p_nland	698	0.522766	0.429809	0	1