

# Mechanism Design

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MASTER IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

1. Introduction.
2. Bayesian Mechanism Design with Transferable Utility:
  - (a) Auctions.
  - (b) Public goods.
  - (c) Bilateral trade.
3. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms.
4. Informational Interdependence (Common Values).
5. Robust Mechanism Design.
6. Non-Transferable Utility.
7. Dynamic Mechanism Design.
8. (Lack of) Commitment.
9. Multiple Principals.

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## Main Reference

- Tilman Börgers: *An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design*, 2013.

## Other References

- Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter, *Designing Economic Mechanisms*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Steven R. Williams, *Communication in Mechanism Design: A Differential Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Dimitrios Diamantaras, with Emina I. Cardamone, Karen A. Campbell, Scott Deacle, and Lisa A. Delgado, *A Toolbox for Economic Design*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009.
- Rakesh Vohra, Mechanism Design, *A Linear Programming Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani, *Algorithmic Game Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Alvin E. Roth, *What have we learned from market design?*, Economic Journal 118 (2008).

More references will be provided along the course for particular topics.