Microeconomics II


Masters in Economics

This website provides information about the course, as well as materials and references useful to prepare it.

DESCRIPTION: This course studies market equilibrium and market failure, and provides an introduction to methods for dealing with individuals' incentives in the design of contracts and social institutions.

INSTRUCTOR: Diego Moreno

TA: Michelangelo Rossi (mrossi@eco.uc3m.es). Recitation Sessions: Feb. 11 and 25, March 10, April 14, and May 5 and 19, from 17:45 to 19:15.

TEXTBOOKS
A. Mas-Colell, M. Whiston and J. Green: Microeconomic Theory, Oxford UP 1995.
I. Macho and D. Perez-Castrillo: An Introduction to the Economics of Information, Oxford UP 2001.

    OTHER REFERENCES
    P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont: Contract Theory, MIT Press 2005.
    R. Gibbons: A premier in Game Theory, Prentice Hall 1992.
    J. E. Harrington: Games, Strategies, and decision making, Worth Publishers 2009.
    J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort: The Theory of Incentives, Princeton UP 2002.
    M. J. Osborne: An introduction to Game Theory, Oxford UP 2003.
    B. Salanié: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press 2005.


PROGRAM
1. Time, Uncertainty and Risk in Competitive Economies. (Mas-Colell et al., chapters 19 and 20.)
2. Market Failure: externalities, public goods, market power, asymmetric information.
(Mas-Colell et al., chapters 10-13.)
3. Incentives and Social Welfare: Mechanism Design.
(Mas-Colell et al., chapters 21 and 23.)
4. Introduction to the Economics of Information. (Macho and Perez-Castrillo, chapters 2 to 5.)

GRADING: There will a midterm exam on March 17, and a comprehensive final exam on May 27.

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