This website provides information about the course, as well as materials and references useful to prepare it.
DESCRIPTION: This course studies market equilibrium and market failure, and provides an introduction to methods for dealing with individuals' incentives in the design of contracts and social institutions.
INSTRUCTOR: Diego Moreno
Michelangelo Rossi (firstname.lastname@example.org). Recitation Sessions: Feb. 11
and 25, March 10, April 14 and 28, and May 19, from 17:45 to 19:15.
A. Mas-Colell, M. Whiston and J. Green: Microeconomic Theory, Oxford UP 1995.
I. Macho and D. Perez-Castrillo: An Introduction to the Economics of Information, Oxford UP 2001.
1. Time, Uncertainty and Risk in Competitive Economies. (Mas-Colell et al., chapters 19 and 20.)
2. Market Failure: externalities, public goods, market power, asymmetric information. (Mas-Colell et al., chapters 10-12.)
3. Moral Hazard. (Macho and Perez-Castrillo, chapters 2 and 3.)
4. Adverse Selection: Screening, Signaling. (Macho and Perez-Castrillo, chapters 4 and 5.)
5. Incentives and Social Welfare: Mechanism Design. (Mas-Colell et al., chapters 21 and 23.)
GRADING: There will a midterm exam on March 17, and a comprehensive final exam on May 27.
© 2016 UC3M - Departamento de Economía