Macroeconomics 3 (MAE/PhD)

Approximating nonlinear models: an introduction

Hernán D. Seoane

UC3M

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Today's lecture

Approximating DSGE models

Taylor series

Introduction to approximation techniques

Log-linear approximation

Algebraic implementation and undetermined coefficients

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Application to the Neoclassical Growth Model

Taylor series

Taylor's theorem

Let's consider a function *f* with derivatives of all orders in (a, b)and M > 0 such that $|f^k(x)| < M$ for all *k* and $x \in (a, b)$. If $x_0 \in (a, b)$

$$f(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{f^k(x_0)}{k!} (x - x_0)^k$$

or

$$f(x) = f(x_0) + \frac{f'(x_0)}{1!}(x - x_0) + \frac{f''(x_0)}{2!}(x - x_0)^2 + \dots$$

Notice how powerful this theorem is: any function (with derivatives) can be re-written (exactly!) in this way

Linearization...

Various ways and shortcuts for approximating a function

Consider a dynamic equation: $x_{t+1} = f(x_t)$

The linear approximation around *x*, by directly applying the theorem is

$$x_{t+1} \approx f(x) + f'(x)(x_t - x)$$

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Note $x_{t+1} = b + ax_t$

|a| < 1 implies local stability

... and Log-linearization

Do the same procedure to log-linearize

Define the log deviation from a steady state by $\hat{x}_t = ln\left(\frac{x_t}{x}\right)$

Log-deviation is approximately a percentage deviation

- Again, consider $x_{t+1} = f(x_t)$
- Note $xe^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} = f(xe^{\hat{x}_t})$

Now approximate with respect to \hat{x}_{t+1}

 $\hat{x}_{t+1} \approx f'(x)\hat{x}_t$

|f'(x)| < 1 implies local stability

Log-linearization

Alternative way

We can do it in a slightly different way

$$\operatorname{Consider} f(x_t) = \frac{g(x_t)}{h(x_t)}$$

Take logs and then approximate with respect to x_t around a point x

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Log-linearization

Uhlig tricks

Suppose we have our function $f(x_t)$ back

Notice that $x_t = xe^{\hat{x}_t}$

Here: *x* is an approximation point

$$\hat{x}_t = \ln(x_t/x) = \ln(x_t) - \ln(x)$$

The following rules hold:

1.
$$e^{\hat{x}_t + a\hat{y}_t} \approx 1 + \hat{x}_t + a\hat{y}_t$$

2. $\hat{x}_t \times \hat{y}_t \approx 0$

3. If \hat{x}_t is a random variable, $E_t \left[ae^{\hat{x}_t} \right] \approx aE_t[\hat{x}_t]$, up to a constant

Overview

So far so good, but in macro we work with dynamic models: their solution is characterized by a system of dynamic nonlinear equations

We usually need to solve dynamic systems (instead of single equations)... and in many cases we need to do it super-fast

Our first step is to study the toolkit in Uhlig (1998)

The toolkit builds on log linearization and the method of undetermined coefficients

Modern macro models need to specify:

- 1. preferences
- 2. technology
- 3. endowments
- 4. information.

Object to study:

1. Planner's problem (specify Planner's objective function)

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2. Competitive Equilibrium (specify markets)

We will do this for the NGM

The NGM: Preferences

Representative agent economy

$$U = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\eta} - 1}{1-\eta}\right]$$

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 $0 < \beta < 1$ is the discount factor

 $\eta>0$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion

The NGM: Technology

Cobb-Douglass production function

$$Y_t = Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho} N_t^{1-\rho}$$

 $0 < \rho < 1$ is the *K* share; $0 < \delta < 1$ is the *K* depreciation rate

 Z_t is the technology shock that evolves as

$$\log Z_t = (1 - \psi) \log \bar{Z} + \psi \log Z_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

where $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$

The NGM: Endowments and information

Endowments: the representative agent has 1 unit of labor every period, $N_t = 1$ and endowed with K_{-1} given before period 0.

Information: choice variables are set with based on all available information I_t up to time t.

The Planner's problem

$$\max \quad U = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\eta} - 1}{1-\eta}\right]$$

s.t.

$$C_t + K_t = Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho} + (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}$$
$$\log Z_t = (1 - \psi) \log \bar{Z} + \psi \log Z_{t-1} + \epsilon_t,$$
$$\epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$
$$K_{-1}; \qquad Z_0$$

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The Planner's problem

To solve it, Lagrangian: $\beta^t \lambda_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier

$$L = \max \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\frac{C_t^{1-\eta} - 1}{1-\eta} - \lambda_t \left(C_t + K_t - Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho} - (1-\delta) K_{t-1}\right)\right)\right]$$

The set of FOC that characterize the solution is given by

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_t} : 0 = C_t + K_t - Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho} - (1-\delta) K_{t-1}$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial C_t} : 0 = C_t^{-\eta} - \lambda_t$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial K_t} : 0 = -\lambda_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} \left(\rho Z_{t+1} K_t^{\rho-1} + (1-\delta) \right) \right]$$

The Planner's problem

Rewrite the FOC and solve for the Steady State

$$C_t = Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho} + (1-\delta)K_{t-1} - K_t$$
$$R_t = \rho Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho-1} + (1-\delta)$$
$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\beta \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \right)^{\eta} R_{t+1} \right]$$
$$\log Z_t = (1-\psi) \log Z + \psi \log Z_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

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Look for a solution to the system where $C_t = \bar{C}$, $R_t = \bar{R}$, $K_t = \bar{K}$, $Z_t = \bar{Z}$, $\forall t$

The Planner's problem

Rewrite the FOC and solve for the Steady State

$$\bar{R} = \frac{1}{\beta}$$
$$\bar{K} = \left(\frac{\rho \bar{Z}}{\bar{R} - 1 + \delta}\right)^{1/(1-\rho)}$$
$$\bar{C} = \bar{Z}\bar{K}^{\rho} - \delta\bar{K}$$

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The Competitive Equilibrium

For the competitive equilibrium we need to consider a representative firm and a representative household The representative firm solves

$$\max Z_t \left(K_{t-1}^{(d)} \right)^{\rho} \left(N_t^{(d)} \right)^{1-\rho} + (1-\rho) K_{t-1}^{(d)} - W_t N_t^{(d)} - R_t K_{t-1}^{(d)}$$

FOC for the firm ("Demand Curves")

$$W_t = (1 - \rho) Z_t \left(K_{t-1}^{(d)} \right)^{\rho} \left(N_t^{(d)} \right)^{-\rho}$$
$$R_t = \rho Z_t \left(K_{t-1}^{(d)} \right)^{\rho-1} \left(N_t^{(d)} \right)^{1-\rho} + (1 - \delta)$$

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The Competitive Equilibrium

The representative household solves

$$\max \quad U = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\eta} - 1}{1-\eta}\right]$$

s.t.

$$C_t + K_t^{(s)} = W_t N^{(s)} + R_t K_{t-1}^{(s)}$$

 $N_t^{(s)} = 1$

and the no-Ponzi game condition: $0 = \lim_{t\to\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \prod_{s=1}^t R_t^{-1} K_t$

The Competitive Equilibrium

The representative household FOC

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_t} : 0 = C_t + K_t^{(s)} - W_t - R_t K_{t-1}^{(s)}$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial C_t} : 0 = C_t^{-\eta} - \lambda_t$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial K_t} : 0 = -\lambda_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1} \right]$$

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The Competitive Equilibrium. Definition

Given $K_{-1}^{(s)}$ and market wages and returns, W_t and R_t , the representative agents solves its problem

Given market wages and returns, W_t and $R_t \forall t$, the representative firm solves its problem taking TFP given

Markets clear:

$$N_t^{(d)} = N_t^{(s)} = N_t$$
$$K_{t-1}^{(d)} = K_{t-1}^{(s)} = K_{t-1}$$
$$C_t + K_t = Z_t K_{t-1}^{\rho} + (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}$$

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Solve for the dynamics around the Steady State

Define the problem

Define the object we are looking for (the concept of equilibrium)

Characterize the solution system

Then, make a choice: are we looking for a global or local solution?

If local, we need to define the Non-stochastic Steady State and approximate the solution around that point.

We now apply the Uhlig's toolbox tricks to log-linearize our set of conditions that characterize the solution to our problem

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Log-linearized conditions

The conditions that characterize the log-linear competitive equilibrium

$$c_t = \frac{Y}{C} z_t + \frac{K}{C} R k_{t-1} - \frac{K}{C} k_t$$
$$r_t = (1 - \beta (1 - \delta))(z_t - (1 - \rho)k_{t-1})$$
$$0 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\eta (c_t - c_{t+1}) + r_{t+1} \right]$$
$$z_t = \psi z_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

This is, yet, not a solution... for this simple problem, we can proceed by pencil and paper

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The Undetermined coefficients method

Postulate recursive linear laws of motion:

$$k_t = \nu_{kk}k_{t-1} + \nu_{kz}z_t$$
$$r_t = \nu_{rk}k_{t-1} + \nu_{rz}z_t$$
$$c_t = \nu_{ck}k_{t-1} + \nu_{cz}z_t$$

We need to find the v_{ij} coefficients (the undetermined coefficients).

Strategy: plug these rules in the log-linearized system of equations and solve for the unknowns

Numerical implementation

Calibrate the model

Parameters	Definition	Value
η	Risk aversion coefficient	1
β	Discount factor	$1/1.01 \approx 0.99$
δ	Depreciation rate	0.025
ρ	Capital share	0.36
Ż	Average TFP	1

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With this calibration

Now it is straightforward to analyze the quantitative implications of this model

$$k_t = 0.965k_{t-1} + 0.075z_t$$
$$r_t = -0.022k_{t-1} + 0.035z_t$$
$$c_t = 0.618k_{t-1} + 0.305z_t$$

recall that $z_t = \psi z_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$. Suppose $\epsilon_0 = 1$ and $\epsilon_t = 0$ for all other t > 0 and compute the trajectory of variables for t > 1

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Impulse Reponse



Note: From Uhlig (1998)

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Alvaro's class this week

- quick review of this class
- go over the matlab codes for simulation, irf, etc, with the Uhlig's toolkit

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UHLIG, H. (1998): "A toolkit for analyzing nonlinear dynamic stochastic models easily manuscript," *University of Tilburg*.

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